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NFIB  V.  SEBELIUS  AND  THE  TRANSFORMATION  OF
THE  TAXING POWER
Barry Cushman*
ABSTRACT
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote for a majority of five Justices in holding that the “shared responsibility
payment” required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) consti-
tuted an imposition of a “tax” rather than a “penalty.”  Thus, even though the Chief
Justice and four other Justices had concluded that the provision was not a legitimate
exercise of the commerce power, the Court held that it was a valid exercise of the taxing
power.
The origin of the distinction between taxes and penalties in taxing power jurispru-
dence is found in the 1922 decision of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., more com-
monly known as the Child Labor Tax Case.  There the Court invalidated a provision
of the Revenue Act of 1918 imposing an excise of ten percent on the net profits of all
firms employing children under specified ages in various tasks, for longer than specified
hours, or at night work.  The Child Labor Tax Case was followed in other, similar
cases in the 1920s and 1930s, and the Court continued to treat those precedents as
good law throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.
Chief Justice Roberts did not reject the authority of the Child Labor Tax Case.
Instead, he reviewed the features of the Child Labor Tax that had prompted Chief
Justice Taft and his colleagues to conclude that the measure imposed a regulatory pen-
alty, and then offered several distinctions between the ACA and the earlier exaction.
But a review of the reaction of child labor reformers to the 1922 decision suggests that
contemporaries would not have regarded those distinctions as constitutionally signifi-
cant.  For child labor advocates in the 1920s did not believe that if they revised the
measure to remove those objectionable features, the tax would then pass constitutional
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muster.  Instead, they regarded the idea of such a constitutional excise as hopeless, and
turned their attention to an unsuccessful effort to amend the Constitution to permit
Congress to enact federal child labor legislation.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of the relevant twenti-
eth-century taxing power precedents.  Part II reviews the decisions of the lower federal
courts concerning the construction and constitutionality of the ACA as a taxing mea-
sure.  Part III canvasses the arguments made in the briefs submitted to the Court,
observing that the decisive taxing power issue received scant attention from the parties.
Part IV scrutinizes Chief Justice Roberts’s efforts to distinguish the Child Labor Tax
Case, concluding that if the assessment of that decision by contemporary observers was
accurate, each of those distinctions is insufficient.  Part V draws on the contemporane-
ous analysis of Professor Thomas Reed Powell to isolate the core principle emerging from
the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny: that a nominal tax is in fact a regulatory
penalty where it imposes an exaction triggered by departure from a detailed and speci-
fied course of conduct, and the exaction is sufficiently onerous to induce those engaged
in the targeted conduct generally to alter their behavior.  Part VI presents an argument,
not considered by the Court, that the ACA might be understood to impose a regulatory
penalty so defined.  If that understanding is correct, then the Court may have effectively
overruled the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny sub silentio, thereby substan-
tially transforming taxing power doctrine.  Part VII explores an alternative, albeit con-
siderably less likely possibility: that contemporary child labor reformers misunderstood
the Child Labor Tax Case, and could have successfully revised and defended a new
Child Labor Tax by altering one or more of the distinguishing features identified by
Chief Justice Roberts.  If that is so, then that unfortunate generation of social activists
squandered fifteen years in fruitless pursuit of a constitutional amendment authorizing
Congress to regulate the labor of children, when a much easier and more expeditious
solution lay right before their eyes.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has revived an old asymmetry in its jurisprudence of
enumerated powers.  In the late nineteenth century and during the first four
decades of the twentieth, Congress frequently sought to achieve regulatory
objectives it could not attain through its commerce power by imposing excise
taxes designed to discourage disfavored activities.1  Occasionally these exac-
tions were challenged before the Supreme Court, and the Justices permitted
this indirect fiscal regulation of such “local” activities as the production of
oleomargarine colored to resemble butter,2 the intrastate distribution of nar-
cotics,3 and the intrastate sale of machine guns and sawed-off shotguns.4  For
decades following the Court’s 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,5 after
which the commerce power was commonly thought to be virtually plenary,
1 See R. ALTON LEE, A HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAXATION 1–141 (1973).
2 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
3 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
4 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
5 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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this asymmetry in the regulatory scope of these two enumerated powers was
effaced.  With the more recent decisions in United States v. Lopez6 and United
States v. Morrison,7 however, the question of whether Congress’s reach under
its taxing power would again exceed its grasp under the Commerce Clause
once again became salient.
To this question we now have our answer.  Beginning in 2014, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) will require every “appli-
cable individual” who has not secured “minimum essential [health insur-
ance] coverage” to make a “shared responsibility payment” to the Internal
Revenue Service.8  In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,9
five Justices held that this “individual mandate” could not be sustained as an
exercise of the commerce power.  Another group of five Justices, however,
held that the provision was a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I, Section 8
power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”10  The decid-
ing vote in each instance was cast by Chief Justice Roberts.
No lower federal court had upheld the mandate as a tax,11 and the par-
ties understandably lavished considerably more attention on the Commerce
Clause issue, which they anticipated would be decisive.  As a taxing power
case, the challenge to the ACA presented two distinct issues that often
seemed to bleed together.  The first was an issue of statutory construction:
whether the language of the statute, which purported to rely upon the com-
merce power rather than the taxing power, expressed the regulatory objec-
tive of inducing people to purchase insurance rather than a fiscal purpose to
raise revenue, and referred to the payment as a “penalty” rather than as a
“tax,” could properly be construed to impose a tax.  The second issue was
whether, assuming that the statute’s language was properly so construed, the
measure imposed a true tax rather than a penalty for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis.  The second issue, in other words, was this: suppose that we
were to imagine that in enacting the statute Congress had purported to rely
on its taxing power rather than on its commerce power, had expressed no
regulatory objective but instead had stated that the law’s purpose was to raise
revenue, and had termed the payment a “tax” rather than a “penalty.”  Under
those circumstances, would the exaction be a tax within the meaning of Arti-
cle I of the Constitution?
The lower federal courts uniformly had concluded that the mandate
could not properly be construed to impose a tax,12 and the dissenting Jus-
tices in Sebelius agreed that several of the statute’s features precluded such a
construction.13  Chief Justice Roberts, by contrast, offered a generous “saving
6 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
7 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act).
8 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2011).
9 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
11 See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part II.
13 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2650–55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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construction” of the statute as a tax,14 leaving the dissenters astonished and
indignant.15  As to the second issue, both Chief Justice Roberts and the dis-
senting Justices critically agreed on the test to be applied.  Each of them
relied upon a definition articulated by Justice Sutherland in a Double Jeop-
ardy case decided in 1931.16  “A tax,” Sutherland explained, “is an enforced
contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty, as the word
is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful
act.”17  Employing this test, the question was whether the ACA made the fail-
ure to acquire qualifying health insurance unlawful.  The dissenters con-
cluded that it did;18 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that under the ACA it
was perfectly legal not to secure such insurance, so long as one paid the tax
imposed for failing to do so.19
This should not have been the end of the matter, for there were deci-
sions that both Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting Justices recognized as
good authority in which the Court had declared a putative tax to be a regula-
tory penalty even though the conduct triggering the tax was not unlawful.
Indeed, one finds the very genesis of the tax/penalty distinction in just such
a case: the 1922 decision of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., more commonly
known as the Child Labor Tax Case.20  There the Court had invalidated a pro-
vision of the Revenue Act of 1918 imposing an excise of ten percent on the
net profits of all firms employing children under specified ages in various
tasks, for longer than specified hours, or at night work.21  The Child Labor
Tax Case was followed in other, similar cases in the 1920s and 1930s, and
none of these decisions has been formally overruled.22
Chief Justice Roberts did not ignore the Child Labor Tax Case.  He
reviewed the features of the Child Labor Tax that prompted Chief Justice
Taft and his colleagues to conclude that the measure imposed a regulatory
penalty, and then offered several distinctions between the ACA and the ear-
lier exaction.23  But a review of the reaction of child labor reformers to the
1922 decision suggests that contemporaries would not have regarded those
distinctions as constitutionally significant.  For child labor advocates in the
1920s did not believe that if they revised the measure to remove those objec-
tionable features, the tax would then pass constitutional muster.  Instead,
they regarded the idea of such a constitutional excise as hopeless, and turned
14 Id. at 2593–94 (majority opinion).
15 Id. at 2650–55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2596 (majority opinion); id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
17 United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).
18 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2652–54 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
19 Id. at 2493–94, 2597 (majority opinion).
20 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
21 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 1200, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919).
22 See infra Sections I.B-C.
23 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96.
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their attention to an unsuccessful effort to amend the Constitution to permit
Congress to enact federal child labor legislation.24
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of the rele-
vant twentieth-century taxing power precedents.  Part II reviews the decisions
of the lower federal courts concerning the construction and constitutionality
of the ACA as a taxing measure.  Part III canvasses the arguments made in
the briefs submitted to the Court, observing that the decisive taxing power
issue received scant attention from the parties.  Part IV scrutinizes Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s efforts to distinguish the Child Labor Tax Case, concluding that
if the assessment of that decision by contemporary observers was accurate,
each of those distinctions is insufficient.  Part V draws on the contemporane-
ous analysis of Professor Thomas Reed Powell to isolate the core principle
emerging from the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny: that a nominal tax is
in fact a regulatory penalty where it imposes an exaction triggered by depar-
ture from a detailed and specified course of conduct, and the exaction is
sufficiently onerous to induce those engaged in the targeted conduct gener-
ally to alter their behavior.  Part VI presents an argument, not considered by
the Court, that the ACA might be understood to impose a regulatory penalty
so defined.  If that understanding is correct, then the Court may have effec-
tively overruled the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny sub silentio, thereby
substantially transforming taxing power doctrine.  Part VII explores an alter-
native, albeit considerably less likely possibility: that contemporary child
labor reformers misunderstood the Child Labor Tax Case, and could have suc-
cessfully revised and defended a new Child Labor Tax by altering one or
more of the distinguishing features identified by Chief Justice Roberts.  If
that is so, then that unfortunate generation of social activists squandered fif-
teen years in fruitless pursuit of a constitutional amendment authorizing
Congress to regulate the labor of children, when a much easier and more
expeditious solution lay right before their eyes.
I. THE PRECEDENTS
The distinction between a true tax and a regulatory penalty may seem
obscure, because until recently it may have seemed like little more than a
remote artifact of the constitutional law of the early twentieth century.  A
review of the relevant precedents therefore may better enable us to appreci-
ate their bearing on the Court’s recent decision upholding the individual
mandate.  This line of doctrinal development is sometimes understandably
characterized as marked by inconsistency and discontinuity.25  One aim of
this and subsequent sections is to caution against exaggeration in this regard,
and to identify the principle that lent unity to this body of doctrine.
24 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 2
(1957) (“The decision put an end for nearly a generation, until late in the New Deal, to
federal efforts to help abolish child labor.” (footnote omitted)).
25 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of
the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1210–18 (2012).
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A. Early Decisions
In Veazie Bank v. Fenno,26 decided in 1869, the Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld a federal excise of ten percent on the issuance of state bank
notes.  The law was clearly designed to tax state bank notes out of circulation,
and the Court sustained the tax as a valid exercise of Congress’s monetary
power to establish and regulate a sound and uniform national currency.27
But Chief Justice Chase’s opinion also maintained that the statute could be
upheld as an exercise of the taxing power.28  The foundation for this conclu-
sion was a conception of the separation of powers that would permeate subse-
quent taxing power decisions.  “[T]he judicial cannot prescribe to the
legislative departments of the government limitations upon the exercise of its
acknowledged powers,” Chase wrote.  “The power to tax may be exercised
oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to
the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected.”29
It was this conception that drove the Court’s 1904 decision in McCray v.
United States.30  There the Court, by a vote of 6-3, upheld a statute that
imposed a tax at a rate of one-fourth of a cent per pound on uncolored
oleomargarine, but at a rate of ten cents per pound where the oleomargarine
was colored to resemble butter.31  There was no doubt that the tax was
designed to discourage the production of oleomargarine colored so that it
would compete with butter.32  The report of the Senate Committee on Agri-
culture and Forestry frankly admitted that the bill’s purpose was “to
encourage the sale of the genuine article and to discourage the fraudulent
sale of the imitation article, and to protect the honest producer, dealer, and
consumer of both butter and oleomargarine.”33  The House Committee on
Agriculture Report similarly confessed that
[t]he object sought by the legislation . . . is to provide the best means of
protecting the public against imposition in the sale of oleomargarine in
guise and under the name of butter, and at the same time protect the pro-
ducer of the genuine article in the full enjoyment of the market to which he
26 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
27 Id. at 548–49.
28 Id. at 547–48.
29 Id. at 548.
30 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
31 Act of May 9, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-110, 32 Stat. 193, 194; McCray, 195 U.S. at 28.
32 See, e.g., A.J. Englehard, Constitutional Law—Taxation—Child Labor Tax Law, 2 WIS.
L. REV. 53, 54 (1922) (“[I]t was common knowledge that the purpose of the tax was to
absolutely suppress the sale of colored butterine . . . .”); Herbert F. Margulies, Federal Police
Power by Taxation: McCray v. United States and the Oleomargarine Tax of 1902, 5 J. S. LEGAL
HIST. 1, 1 (1997) (explaining that the oleomargarine tax was passed “at the behest of dairy-
men” so “consumers would drastically curtail their buying of colored oleomargarine”); Wil-
liam E. Burby, Note, Constitutional Law—Tax on Employment of Child Labor, 21 MICH. L. REV.
88, 88 (1922) (“It was known that the passage of [the Oleomargarine Tax] was to protect
the dairy interests and destroy the oleomargarine industry.”).
33 S. REP. NO. 57-530, at 1 (1902).
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is justly and honestly entitled as a result of the general demand upon the
part of the public for his product.34
“[S]tringent measures” were “necessary for the protection of the public
and producers of butter against fraud in the sale of oleomargarine,” and
“only the burdening of the counterfeit or imitation article with a heavy tax,
taking from it the large profit that is the incentive to its fraudulent sale as
butter,” could “successfully correct the flagrant abuses accompanying its
sale.”35  The Senate Committee’s Minority Report charged that
[t]he advocates of this proposed legislation admit that their object is to place
the tax on oleomargarine so high that it can not be placed upon the markets
of the country if colored. . . . The object . . . of imposing this excessive tax of
10 cents a pound upon colored oleomargarine is not for the purpose of
raising revenue, but for the purpose of prohibiting its manufacture, and of
thus destroying the industry.36
The bill was thus “not a revenue measure.”37
Chief Justice White’s analysis of the taxing power issue treated the ques-
tion as if it were wholly controlled by separation of powers concerns.  As
White understood McCray’s argument, he was contending that
because a particular department of the government may exert its lawful pow-
ers with the object or motive of reaching an end not justified, therefore it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to restrain the exercise of a lawful power
wherever it seems to the judicial mind that such lawful power has been
abused.38
White recoiled from the proposition that the judiciary should intervene
to prevent such a pretextual exercise of an enumerated power, an exercise of
a “lawful power . . . for an unlawful purpose.”39  As White saw it, McCray’s
claim “reduce[d] itself to the contention that, under our constitutional sys-
tem, the abuse by one department of the government of its lawful powers is
to be corrected by the abuse of its powers by another department.”40  That
proposition, White worried,
if sustained, would destroy all distinction between the powers of the respec-
tive departments of the government, would put an end to that confidence
and respect for each other which it was the purpose of the Constitution to
uphold, and would thus be full of danger to the permanence of our
institutions.41
White quoted at length from judicial paeans to separation of powers,
and worried aloud about “judicial usurpation” overthrowing “the entire dis-
34 H.R. REP. NO. 57-255, at 2 (1902).
35 Id. at 3.
36 S. REP. NO. 57-530, pt. 2, at 3 (1902).
37 Id. at 4.
38 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 54 (1904).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 54–55.
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tinction between the legislative, judicial[,] and executive departments of the
government, upon which our system is founded.”42  He recognized that the
lack of judicial authority to invalidate the exercise of an enumerated power
animated by “a wrong[ful] motive or purpose” might result in “temporarily
effectual” “abuses of a power conferred.”43  But he insisted, as Veazie Bank
had maintained, that the remedy lay “not in the abuse by the judicial author-
ity of its functions, but in the people, upon whom, after all, under our institu-
tions, reliance must be placed for the correction of abuses committed in the
exercise of a lawful power.”44
The Court was thus powerless to inquire into “the motive or purpose of
Congress” in enacting the measure, and it was “self-evident” that the statute
on its face levied an excise tax.45  It therefore followed that the Act was
“within the grant of power.”46  The contention that enforcement of the Act
would “destroy or restrict the manufacture of artificially colored oleomarga-
rine” was entirely irrelevant.47  Because “the taxing power conferred by the
Constitution” knew “no limits except those expressly stated in that instru-
ment, it must follow, if a tax be within the lawful power, the exertion of that
power may not be judicially restrained because of the results to arise from its
exercise.”48  The incidental effects that such taxation might have on matters
otherwise subject to state regulatory authority did not impugn the validity of
the tax.49
United States v. Doremus,50 decided in 1919, involved a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Harrison Act of 1914.51  Section 1 of the Act required persons
who produced, imported, or transferred opium or cocoa leaves or any com-
pound, derivative or preparation thereof to register with the collector of
internal revenue in his district.52  At the time of registration, all such persons
were required to pay to the collector a special annual tax of $1.00.53  It was
made unlawful for any person required to register under the Act to engage in
any of the enumerated drug-related activities without having registered and
paid the special tax.54  Section 2 made it unlawful for any person to transfer
any of the listed drugs except pursuant to a written order of the person to
whom the drugs were so transferred, “on a form to be issued in blank for that
purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”55  Anyone transferring
42 Id. at 54.
43 Id. at 55.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 59.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 59–60.
50 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
51 Act of Dec. 17, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785.
52 Id. at 785.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 786.
55 Id.
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any of the listed drugs was required to preserve the order for a period of two
years so that it could be inspected by agents of the Treasury Department.56
The statute created exemptions for dispensations to a patient by a physician
in the course of his professional practice, and by pharmacists pursuant to
prescriptions from a treating physician, so long as proper records of such
prescriptions were preserved.57
Doremus was a physician who had duly registered and had paid the spe-
cial tax required by the first section of the Act.58  He was charged with unlaw-
fully distributing heroin to a known addict without the written order
required by Section 2 of the Act.59  The indictment charged that Doremus
did not distribute the heroin in the course of his regular professional prac-
tice, nor for the treatment of any disease from which the addict was suffering,
but instead “for the purpose of gratifying [the addict’s] appetite for the drug
as an habitual user thereof.”60  Doremus demurred to the indictment, and
the district court ruled in his favor on the ground that the Act was “not a
revenue measure,” but was instead “an invasion of the police power reserved
to the States.”61
The Court upheld the Act by a vote of 5-4, reaffirming the principles
established in Veazie Bank and McCray.  “[F]rom an early day,” wrote Justice
Day for the majority,
the court has held that the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of
federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that sub-
ject.  If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise
of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invali-
dated because of the supposed motives which induced it.62
The fact that “the same business may be regulated by the police power of
the State” was irrelevant, for an exercise of the taxing power “may not be
declared unconstitutional because its effect may be to accomplish another
purpose as well as the raising of revenue.”63  The “decisive question,” there-
fore, was whether Sections 1 and 2 of the Act had “any relation to the raising
of revenue.”64  It could not be “successfully disputed” that Congress had
power to levy the excise imposed on opium dealers in Section 1, which “spe-
cifically provid[ed] for the raising of revenue.”65  And the Court could not
agree that the provisions of Section 2 had “nothing to do with facilitating the
collection of the revenue” sought by Section 1.66  Those provisions aimed “to
56 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 91 (1919).
57 Id. at 88, 91–93.
58 Id. at 90.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 89.
62 Id. at 93.
63 Id. at 93–94.
64 Id. at 94.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 95.
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keep the traffic aboveboard and subject to inspection by those authorized to
collect the revenue.”67  They accordingly tended “to diminish the opportu-
nity of unauthorized persons to obtain the drugs and sell them clandestinely
without paying the tax.”68  “Congress may have deemed it wise to prevent
such possible dealings because of their effect upon the collection of the
revenue.”69
The tax in Doremus was sustained by the narrowest of margins, and the
dissenting Justices were led by the author of McCray himself.  Chief Justice
White noted that he
dissents because he is of opinion that the court below correctly held the act
of Congress, in so far as it embraced the matters complained of, to be
beyond the constitutional power of Congress to enact because to such extent
the statute was a mere attempt by Congress to exert a power not delegated,
that is, the reserved police power of the States.70
White’s dissent, which was joined by Justices McKenna, Van Devanter,
and McReynolds, offered tangible evidence that several of the Justices were
becoming concerned about Congress’s increasingly aggressive use of the tax-
ing power to achieve regulatory ends.71
B. The Child Labor Tax Case and Its Progeny
Those concerns would inspire an 8-1 majority of the Court to invalidate
the Child Labor Tax just three years later.  In 1916, Congress had passed the
Keating-Owen Act,72 which prohibited the interstate shipment of articles pro-
duced by firms that employed children under the age of sixteen in mines or
quarries, or employed children under the age of fourteen in any mill, can-
nery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, or employed chil-
dren between the ages of fourteen and sixteen in this latter category of
businesses for more than eight hours per day, or for more than six days in
any week, or before the hour of 6:00 a.m., or after the hour of 7:00 p.m.73  In
1918, the Court invalidated the Act in the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,74
holding that the statute was not a legitimate exercise of the commerce
power.75  Relying on the authority of McCray, Congress responded by adding
a provision to the Revenue Act of 1918 imposing a ten percent excise on the
net profits of any firm employing children in violation of any of the standards
67 Id. at 94.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 95.
70 Id. (White, C.J., dissenting).
71 Id.
72 Act of Sept. 1, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675.
73 Id.
74 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
75 Id. at 276.
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established by the Keating-Owen Act.76  That exaction was successfully chal-
lenged in the Child Labor Tax Case.77
The question, as Chief Justice Taft saw it, was “[d]oes this law impose a
tax with only that incidental restraint and regulation which a tax must inevita-
bly involve?  Or does it regulate by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty?”78
Taft recognized that if the excise were one “on a commodity or other thing
of value we might not be permitted under previous decisions of this court to
infer solely from its heavy burden that the act intends a prohibition instead
of a tax.”79  But this act was “more.”  It provided “a heavy exaction for a
departure from a detailed and specified course of conduct in business.”80  If
an employer were to depart from “this prescribed course of business, he
[was] to pay to the Government one-tenth of his entire net income in the
business for a full year.”81  That amount was “not to be proportioned in any
degree to the extent or frequency of the departures,” but was “to be paid by
the employer in full measure whether he employs five hundred children for a
year, or employs only one for a day.”82
Moreover, if the employer did not know that the child was within the
specified age limit, he was excused from payment.  It was “only where he
knowingly departs from the prescribed course that payment is to be
exacted.”83  “Scienter,” the Chief Justice explained, “is associated with penal-
ties[,] not with taxes.”84  In addition, the employer’s factory was
to be subject to inspection at any time not only by the taxing officers of the
Treasury, the Department normally charged with the collection of taxes, but
also by the Secretary of Labor and his subordinates whose normal function is
the advancement and protection of the welfare of the workers.85
“In the light of these features of the act,” Taft concluded:
a court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the
employment of children within the age limits prescribed.  Its prohibitory
and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable.  All others can see and
understand this.  How can we properly shut our minds to it?86
Taft recognized that taxes were “occasionally imposed in the discretion
of the legislature on proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining
revenue from them and with the incidental motive of discouraging them by
making their continuance onerous.”87  Such measures did not “lose their
76 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 1200, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919).
77 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
78 Id. at 36.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 36–37.
84 Id. at 37.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 38.
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character as taxes because of the incidental motive.”88  Nevertheless, the
Chief Justice insisted, “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing
features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a
mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.  Such is
the case in the law before us.”89  The statute’s “so-called tax” was in fact “a
penalty to coerce people of a State to act as Congress wishes them to act in
respect of a matter completely the business of the state government under
the Federal Constitution.”90
The Chief Justice conceded that “[o]ut of a proper respect for the acts
of a coordinate branch of the Government, this court has gone far to sustain
taxing acts as such, even though there has been ground for suspecting from
the weight of the tax it was intended to destroy its subject.  But, in the act
before us,” he insisted, “the presumption of validity cannot prevail, because
the proof of the contrary is found on the very face of its provisions.”91
McCray and Veazie Bank were distinguished on the ground that “[i]n
neither of these cases did the law objected to show on its face[,] as does the
law before us[,] the detailed specifications of a regulation of a state concern
and business with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such regula-
tion.”92  By contrast, the Child Labor Tax, which did display these features
“on the face of the act,” was a “penalty.”93
Taft did not deny that the reduction of child labor was a worthy policy
objective.  Nevertheless, he maintained that it was “the high duty and func-
tion” of the Court “to decline to recognize or enforce seeming laws of Con-
gress, dealing with subjects not entrusted to Congress[,] but left or
committed by the supreme law of the land to the control of the States,” even
where it required the Justices “to refuse to give effect to legislation designed
to promote the highest good.”94  “The good sought in unconstitutional legis-
lation,” Taft warned, “is an insidious feature because it leads citizens and leg-
islators of good purpose to promote it without thought of . . . the harm which
will come from breaking down recognized standards.”95  “Grant the validity
of this law,” the Chief Justice reasoned,
and all that Congress would need to do, hereafter, in seeking to take over to
its control any one of the great number of subjects of public interest, juris-
diction of which the States have never parted with, and which are reserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of
complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon
departures from it.  To give such magic to the word “tax” would be to break
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 39.
91 Id. at 37–38.
92 Id. at 42.
93 Id. at 39.
94 Id. at 37.
95 Id.
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down all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely
wipe out the sovereignty of the States.96
It would constitute a “breach” in “the ark of our covenant,” which had
been responsible for the “maintenance of local self government, on the one
hand, and the national power, on the other,” and under which the country
had “been able to endure and prosper for near a century and a half.”97  The
case therefore required
the application of the principle announced by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland . . . : “Should Congress, in the execution of its powers,
adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitution; or should Con-
gress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accom-
plishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come
before it, to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.”98
Unlike Hammer, which was decided by a vote of 5–4, the decision in the
Child Labor Tax Case was supported by eight of the nine Justices.99  Three of
the Hammer dissenters—Justices McKenna, Holmes, and Brandeis—each
joined Taft’s opinion.  Justice Brandeis wrote on his return of Taft’s circu-
lated draft opinion, “Yes Sir: You have made this clear & forceful & have
done all that can be done to distinguish the earlier cases.”100  Taft later circu-
lated a “[f]urther revision to meet suggestions of the brethren,” to which
Brandeis replied, “Yes.  A very good opinion.”101
Hill v. Wallace102 was decided the same day as the Child Labor Tax Case.
The Future Trading Act of 1921103 imposed a tax of twenty cents per bushel
on all contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery, but exempted from
its application sales on boards of trade designated as contract markets by the
Secretary of Agriculture.104  The Secretary could designate a board as a con-
tract market only if it fulfilled a detailed series of conditions and require-
ments set forth in the Act.105  The petitioners argued that the Act “in effect
96 Id. at 38.
97 Id. at 37.
98 Id. at 39–40 (citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 423 (1819)).
99 Id. at 44 (noting the dissent of Justice Clarke).
100 Circulated Child Labor Case Draft Opinion, microformed on William H. Taft Papers,
Reel 614 (Libr. of Cong., 1969).
101 Id.  Alexander Bickel suggested that Brandeis actually suppressed his dissenting
views in the Child Labor Tax Case, as he sometimes did in other cases, for the “tactical”
reason of fostering amicable relations with Taft and his other colleagues in the majority.
BICKEL, supra note 24, at 18–19.  Stephen Wood disagrees, concluding that in the Child
Labor Tax Case both Holmes and Brandeis voted their convictions that the statute was
unconstitutional. STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
286–92 (1968).
102 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
103 Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 67-66, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
104 Id. § 4.
105 Hill, 259 U.S. at 45, 63–64.
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prohibits all those who are not members of a board of trade, which has been
designated by the Secretary of Agriculture a contract market under [the Act],
from making any contracts of sales for future delivery.”106
The Court unanimously held that these provisions of the Act could not
be sustained as an exercise of the taxing power of Congress.107  Chief Justice
Taft concluded that the decision in the Child Labor Tax Case “completely cov-
ers this case.”108  Here it was “impossible to escape the conviction, from a full
reading of this law, that it was enacted for the purpose of regulating the con-
duct of business of boards of trade through supervision of the Secretary of
Agriculture.”109  Indeed, the title of the Act recited that one of its purposes
was the regulation of Boards of Trade.110  The imposition of a tax of twenty
cents per bushel was “most burdensome.”111  The Revenue Act imposed a tax
on contracts for sales for future delivery of only two cents per $100 of
value.112  The tax imposed by the Future Trading Act, by contrast, varied
according to the price and character of the grain from fifteen to fifty percent
of its value.113  The “manifest purpose of the tax” was “to compel boards of
trade to comply with regulations,” many of which had “no relevancy to the
collection of the tax at all.”114  The Act was thus, “in essence and on its
face[,] a complete regulation of boards of trade, with a penalty of 20 cents a
bushel on all ‘futures’ to coerce boards of trade and their members into com-
pliance.”115  When this purpose was “declared in the title to the bill,” and was
“so clear from the effect of the provisions of the bill itself,” it left “no ground”
upon which its provisions could be “sustained as a valid exercise of the taxing
power.”116
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,117 decided in 1936, considered the validity of
provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.118  That Act
established an elaborate scheme for the creation of a national commission119
which was to promulgate a national Bituminous Coal Code120 involving the
organization of numerous coal districts, the setting up of numerous boards in
the districts, and the fixing of all prices for bituminous coal, and of the
wages, hours and working conditions of the miners, throughout the coun-
106 Id. at 47.
107 Id. at 68.
108 Id. at 67.
109 Id. at 66.
110 Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 67–66, 42 Stat. 187, 187 (1921).
111 Hill, 259 U.S. at 66.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 66–67.
117 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
118 Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-402, 49 Stat. 991.
119 Id. § 2(a).
120 Id. § 4.
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try.121  It also imposed an excise tax of 15% on the sale price or market value
at the mine of all bituminous coal produced in the country, but provided
that those producers who submitted to the price-fixing and labor provisions
of the Code would receive a 90% credit against the tax.122  The constitution-
ality of the Act was successfully challenged in Carter Coal.  Following the
authority of the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court held that the “so-called excise
tax” was “clearly not a tax[,] but a penalty.”123  It was “not imposed for reve-
nue[,] but exacted as a penalty to compel compliance with the regulatory
provisions of the act.”124  Indeed, Justice Sutherland observed, “[t]hat the
‘tax’ is[,] in fact[,] a penalty is not seriously in dispute.”125  The Government
conceded “that the validity of the exaction does not rest upon the taxing
power[,] but upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce;
and that[,] if the act in respect of the labor and price-fixing provisions be not
upheld, the ‘tax’ must fall with them.”126
As the historian of regulatory taxation R. Alton Lee observes, these deci-
sions constituted a refinement rather than a rejection of McCray.  “As if to
demonstrate that the [McCray] decision had not been overturned in 1922,”
Lee notes, “the Supreme Court refused to hear a case ten years later involv-
ing a discriminatory tax on ticket scalping.”127  The Revenue Act of 1926 had
retained a World War I era five percent excise on tickets to places of amuse-
ment, “but further provided for an exactment of 50 percent on the resale of
tickets on the amount exceeding fifty cents over the price printed on the
ticket.”128  In 1928 Congress raised the permissible mark-up from fifty to sev-
enty-five cents.129  In F. Couthoui, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Claims
relied upon McCray in sustaining the constitutionality of the scalping tax.130
The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari,131 Lee concludes, “indicated a
121 Carter, 298 U.S. at 281–82.
122 Id. at 280–81.  The House report maintained that, even if every operator in the
country submitted to the Code, the tax would still produce $10 million annually. H.R. REP.
NO. 74-1800, at 10 (1935).  The minority report argued that the exaction was unconstitu-
tional because its purpose was not to raise revenue, but was instead “a penalty to compel,
through direct coercion, the submission as to regulations not otherwise within the power
of Congress to enforce.” Id. at 46; see also 79 CONG. REC. 13,460 (1935) (statement of Rep.
Cooper) (arguing that the bill’s taxing provision was “coercive and not for the purpose of
raising revenue”); id. at 13,484 (statement of Rep. Treadway) (“It is freely admitted by the
proponents of the bill that the object of these tax and drawback provisions is not to raise
revenue but to impose a penalty on mine operators who do not accept and comply with the
provisions of the proposed bituminous-coal code.”); LEE, supra note 1, at 154–56.
123 Carter, 298 U.S. at 288.
124 Id. at 289.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 LEE, supra note 1, at 138–39.
128 Id. at 139.
129 Id. at 139–40.
130 F. Couthoui, Inc. v. United States, 54 F.2d 158, 161 (Ct. Cl. 1931).
131 F. Couthoui, Inc. v. United States, 285 U.S. 548 (1932).
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continued adherence to the McCray principle.”132 McCray and the Child
Labor Tax Case co-existed throughout this period,133 and they would continue
to do so.
C. Later Cases
Sonzinsky v. United States,134 decided in 1937, involved a challenge to Sec-
tion 2 of the National Firearms Act of 1934,135 which imposed an annual
license tax of $200 on all dealers in firearms.  The exaction was essentially a
tax on dealers in machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and silencers—the Act
defined a “firearm” as “a shotgun or a rifle having a barrel less than eighteen
inches in length, or any other weapon, except a pistol or revolver, from
which a shot is discharged by an explosive, if capable of being concealed on
the person, or a machine gun, and includes a muffler or silencer for any
firearm.”136  Sonzinsky argued that the levy was “not a true tax, but a penalty
imposed for the purpose of suppressing traffic in a certain noxious type of
firearms, the local regulation of which is reserved to the states because not
granted to the national government.”137
Justice Stone wrote the opinion upholding the tax.138  First, he distin-
guished the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny.  Unlike those cases, Stone
pointed out, the National Firearms Act did not contain “regulatory provisions
related to a purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in
other cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing the
regulations.”139  The challenged provision contained “no regulation other
than the mere registration provisions,” which were “obviously supportable as
in aid of a revenue purpose.”140  The exaction was “[o]n its face . . . only a
taxing measure,” and was not a penalty simply “by virtue of its deterrent
effect on the activities taxed.”141  Every tax was “in some measure regulatory,”
to “some extent” interposing “an economic impediment to the activity taxed
as compared with others not taxed.”142 Veazie Bank, McCray, and Doremus
each had established “that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to
be an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the tax is
burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.”143  Those cases
further established that the Court was not competent to inquire into “the
132 LEE, supra note 1, at 140.
133 Margulies, supra note 32, at 4 (arguing that the Child Labor Tax Case “did not over-
turn McCray, and in fact Chief Justice Taft reconciled the two”).
134 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
135 National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
136 Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 511–12.
137 Id. at 512.
138 Id. at 511.
139 Id. at 513.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitution-
ally conferred upon it.”144  At least where the tax was not “attended by an
offensive regulation,” the Court would “not undertake, by collateral inquiry
as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe to Congress an
attempt, under the guise of taxation, to exercise another power denied by
the Federal Constitution.”145  The tax was productive of some revenue, hav-
ing been paid by twenty-seven dealers in 1934 and by twenty-two in 1935.146
Because it was “not attended by an offensive regulation,” and “operate[d] as
a tax,” it was “within the national taxing power.”147
Lest we think that Sonzinsky constituted a departure from the Child Labor
Tax Case, it bears emphasis that the decision was unanimous, and was joined
by each of the Four Horsemen and by the three remaining members of the
majority in the Child Labor Tax Case: Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Brandeis.  The unanimity of the opinion was deceptive, but only mildly.  On
the returns of Justice Stone’s circulated opinion, Chief Justice Hughes and
Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Roberts all wrote “I agree.”  Justices
Butler and Cardozo replied with a confirmatory “Yes.”  Only the dyspeptic
Justice McReynolds wrote disconsolately, “I don’t think so; but if all others do
they must prevail though wrong.”148
United States v. Sanchez,149 decided in 1950, upheld the Marihuana Tax
Act of 1937.150  That Act was designed to “‘raise revenue and at the same
time render extremely difficult the acquisition of marihuana by persons who
desire it for illicit uses’”151 by “restricting traffic in marihuana to accepted
industrial and medicinal channels.”152  The Act, which clearly was modeled
on the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act upheld in Doremus, imposed a special tax
ranging from $1 to $24 on “‘every person who imports, manufactures, pro-
duces, compounds, sells, deals in, dispenses, prescribes, administers, or gives
away marihuana.’”153  The statute further required that such persons register
at the time of the payment of the tax with the Collector of the District in
which their businesses were located, and made it unlawful for any person to
transfer marihuana except in pursuance of a written order of the transferee
on a blank form issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.154  At the time he
applied for such an order form, the transferee was required to pay a tax of $1
per ounce if he had paid the special tax and registered, or $100 per ounce if
144 Id. at 513–14.
145 Id. at 514.
146 Id. at 514 n.1.
147 Id. at 514.
148 Returns of opinion in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), Box 63,
Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Library of Congress.
149 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
150 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551.
151 Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 43 (quoting S. REP. NO. 75-900, at 3 (1937)).
152 Id. at 44.
153 Id. at 43 (quoting Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 § 2(a)).
154 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 §§ 2(e), 6(a).
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he had not paid the special tax and registered.155  The transferor was also
made liable for the tax so imposed in the event the transfer was made without
an order form and without the payment of the tax by the transferee.156  In
Sanchez, transferors who had been subjected to the tax challenged the exac-
tion as an unconstitutional regulatory penalty.157
Justice Clark wrote for a unanimous Court that the levy was valid not-
withstanding its “regulatory effect” and “close resemblance to a penalty.”158
Sonzinsky established that it was “beyond serious question that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely
deters the activities taxed,” “even though the revenue obtained is obviously
negligible,” “or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.”159  Nor
did “a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Con-
gress might not otherwise regulate.”160  As Justice Sutherland had written for
a unanimous Court in 1934, two years before the decision in Carter Coal,
“ ‘[f]rom the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained taxes
although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which,
considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to
realize by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment.’”161  Like
those exactions, the Marihuana Tax was “a legitimate exercise of the taxing
power despite its collateral regulatory purpose and effect.”162
United States v. Kahriger,163 handed down in 1953, concerned the consti-
tutionality of the occupational tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1951,
which imposed an excise on persons engaged in the business of accepting
wagers, and required such persons to register with the Collector of Internal
Revenue.  Kahriger, who was charged with willfully failing to register and pay
the tax, argued that “Congress, under the pretense of exercising its power to
tax has attempted to penalize illegal intrastate gambling through the regula-
tory features of the Act and has thus infringed the police power which is
reserved to the states.”164  Justice Reed wrote the opinion rejecting this chal-
lenge.165  The fact that there was “legislative history indicating a congres-
sional motive to suppress wagering” was not fatal, Reed explained, because
the “intent to curtail and hinder, as well as tax, was also manifest” in McCray,
Doremus, Sonzinsky, and Sanchez, and in each of those cases the tax had been
upheld.166  It was “conceded that a federal excise tax does not cease to be
155 Id. § 7(a)(1)–(2).
156 Id. § 7(b).
157 Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 43–44.
158 Id. at 44.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 44–45 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934)).
162 Id. at 45.
163 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled in part by Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
164 Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
165 Id. at 23.
166 Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
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valid merely because it discourages or deters the activities taxed.”167  Nor was
the tax invalid “because the revenue obtained is negligible.”168  It was true
that the wagering tax, like other taxes that the Court had upheld, had a “reg-
ulatory effect.”169  But it also produced annual revenue of over four million
dollars, which was considerably more than the amounts produced by “both
the narcotics and firearms taxes which we have found valid.”170
Reed recognized that
[t]he difficulty of saying when the power to lay uniform taxes is curtailed,
because its use brings a result beyond the direct legislative power of Con-
gress, has given rise to diverse decisions.  In that area of abstract ideas, a final
definition of the line between state and federal power has baffled judges and
legislators.171
As the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny demonstrated, “[p]enalty provi-
sions in tax statutes added for breach of a regulation concerning activities in
themselves subject only to state regulation have caused this Court to declare
the enactments invalid.”172  But “[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to
any tax need,” courts were “without authority to limit the exercise of the tax-
ing power.”173  All of the provisions of the excise at issue were “adapted to
the collection of a valid tax.”174  The registration provisions made the tax
“simpler to collect,” and were thus “directly and intimately related to the col-
lection of the tax,” and “‘obviously supportable as in aid of a revenue
purpose.’”175
The Sonzinsky Court did not purport to overrule the Child Labor Tax
Case; instead, Justice Stone’s opinion for the majority distinguished it.
Neither did the Sanchez or Kahriger Courts suggest that the Child Labor Tax
Case was not binding authority.  Indeed, Justice Reed’s opinion in Kahriger
treated both the Child Labor Tax Case and Hill v. Wallace as if they remained
good law.176  In his Kahriger dissent, Justice Frankfurter stood foursquare
behind the Child Labor Tax Case decision.  “[W]hen oblique use is made of
the taxing power as to matters which substantively are not within the powers
delegated to Congress,” Frankfurter insisted, “the Court cannot shut its eyes
to what is obviously, because designedly, an attempt to control conduct which
the Constitution left to the responsibility of the States, merely because Con-
gress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue mea-
sure.”177  For
167 Id. at 28.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 29.
172 Id. at 31.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 31–32 (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)).
176 Id. at 28 n.5, 29 n.6, 31 n.10.
177 Id. at 38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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to allow what otherwise is excluded from congressional authority to be
brought within it by casting legislation in the form of a revenue measure
could, as so significantly expounded in the Child Labor Tax Case, offer an
easy way for the legislative imagination to control “any one of the great num-
ber of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the States have never
parted with . . . .”178
“I say ‘significantly,’” Frankfurter reminded his audience,
because Mr. Justice Holmes and two of the Justices who had joined his dis-
sent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, McKenna and Brandeis, JJ., agreed with the
opinion in the Child Labor Tax Case.  Issues of such gravity affecting the bal-
ance of powers within our federal system are not susceptible of comprehen-
sive statement by smooth formulas such as that a tax is nonetheless a tax
although it discourages the activities taxed, or that a tax may be imposed
although it may effect ulterior ends.  No such phrase, however fine and well-
worn, enables one to decide the concrete case.179
Yet Frankfurter was not accusing the majority of overruling the Child
Labor Tax Case.  He was instead maintaining that the majority was declining to
enforce a broader principle within which its holding was subsumed:
A nominal taxing measure must be found an inadmissible intrusion into
a domain of legislation reserved for the States not merely when Congress
requires that such a measure is to be enforced through a detailed scheme of
administration beyond the obvious fiscal needs, as in the Child Labor Tax
Case,
Frankfurter insisted.180
That is one ground for holding that Congress was constitutionally disrespect-
ful of what is reserved to the States.  Another basis for deeming such a for-
mal revenue measure inadmissible is presented by this case.  In addition to
the fact that Congress was concerned with activity beyond the authority of
the Federal Government, the enforcing provision of this enactment is
designed for the systematic confession of crimes with a view to prosecution
for such crimes under State law.181
178 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)).
179 Id.  The Justice continued:
What is relevant to judgment here is that, even if the history of this legislation as it
went through Congress did not give one the libretto to the song, the context of
the circumstances which brought forth this enactment—sensationally exploited
disclosures regarding gambling in big cities and small, the relation of this gam-
bling to corrupt politics, the impatient public response to these disclosures, the
feeling of ineptitude or paralysis on the part of local law-enforcing agencies—
emphatically supports what was revealed on the floor of Congress, namely, that
what was formally a means of raising revenue for the Federal Government was
essentially an effort to check if not to stamp out professional gambling.
Id. at 38–39.
180 Id. at 39.
181 Id.  Justice Douglas, “while not joining in the entire opinion” of Justice Frankfurter,
“agree[d] with the views expressed herein that this tax is an attempt by the Congress to
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That is, a nominal taxing measure was invalid whenever it was designed to
infringe any of the affirmative limitations imposed by the first ten amend-
ments to the Constitution.
That was precisely the case in the 1994 decision of Department of Revenue
of Montana v. Kurth Ranch.182  There, members of the Kurth family were
arrested and pled guilty to drug possession charges related to their cultiva-
tion and harvesting of marijuana plants.183  The state of Montana thereafter
sought to collect a state tax levied on the possession and storage of danger-
ous drugs.184  The Supreme Court held that the tax, which averaged four
times the market value of the confiscated drugs on which it was imposed,
constituted a successive punishment for the same offense in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.185  The Court recognized that Sonzinsky and Sanchez
established that “neither a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent
purpose” automatically marked the tax as punitive.186  But the Child Labor
Tax Case had established that “ ‘there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punish-
ment.’”187  After surveying the features of the tax, the Court found that,
“[t]aken as a whole,” the Montana drug tax was “too far removed . . . from a
standard tax assessment to escape characterization as a punishment.”188
Thus, none of these later decisions overruled the Child Labor Tax Case,
and the Court cited it as authoritative precedent as recently as 1994.  As child
labor historian Stephen Wood wrote in 1968, the Child Labor Tax Case
“remains the authority, and forty years later is still the law of the land, condi-
tioning congressional action and judicial decision-making.  The judicial
revolution that overtook the commerce power in the late thirties did not
bring reversal.”189
II. THE TAXING POWER ARGUMENT IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
All of the lower federal courts concluded that the minimum coverage
provision was a regulatory penalty rather than a tax,190 but they took differ-
ing views on the status of the Child Labor Tax Case.  Three district courts
control conduct which the Constitution has left to the responsibility of the States.” Id. at
40.
182 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
183 Id. at 771–72.
184 Id. at 773.
185 Id. at 784.
186 Id. at 780.
187 Id. at 779 (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)).
188 Id. at 783.
189 WOOD, supra note 101, at 284 (1968).  Alexander Bickel similarly wrote in 1957 that
“the Child Labor Tax Case retains influence.” BICKEL, supra note 24, at 19.
190 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2655 (2012) (Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[U]ntil today, no federal court has accepted the
implausible argument that § 5000A is an exercise of the tax power.”).
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reached the conclusion that the shared responsibility payment was a regula-
tory penalty rather than a tax, but only for purposes of determining whether
suits challenging the ACA were barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.  These
courts did not address the question of whether the shared responsibility pay-
ment was a tax for purposes of constitutional analysis.191  All of the lower
courts that did address this issue, however, concluded that Congress
intended the Act’s shared responsibility payment to impose a regulatory pen-
alty rather than a tax.
Several features of the Act’s language and legislative history led the dis-
trict and circuit courts to coalesce around this view.  First, the statute
expressly characterized the exaction as a “penalty” rather than as a “tax.”192
This was especially significant in view of the fact that earlier versions of the
bill had expressly imposed a “tax” on applicable individuals failing to acquire
minimum coverage, which indicated that the ultimate choice of terminology
was conscious and deliberate.193  Second, several other sections of the Act
expressly imposed taxes, demonstrating that Congress understood the differ-
ence between a tax and a penalty and knew how to impose a tax when it
intended to do so.194  Third, the Act did not purport on its face to be exercis-
ing the taxing power in imposing the shared responsibility payment for fail-
ure to acquire health insurance.  Instead, the legislative findings made it
clear that Congress had relied exclusively on the power conferred by the
Commerce Clause.195  The fact that the penalty was to be placed in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code under the heading “Miscellaneous Excise Taxes” was of no
consequence, as the Code contains and the IRS enforces many penalties as
well as taxes, and the Code itself196 expressly provides that such a placement
does not give rise to any inference or presumption that the exaction was
191 Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d 684,
694–97 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 626–29 (W.D.
Va. 2010); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903, 924 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
192 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314–15 (11th
Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 551 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 40 (D.D.C. 2011); Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 786 (E.D. Va. 2010); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134–35 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
193 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d at 1317; Mead, 766 F.
Supp. 2d at 41; Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786–87; Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1134–36.
194 Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 551 (Sutton, J., concurring in part); Florida v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d at 1316–17; Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 40;
Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 787; Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d at 1135–36.
195 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d at 1316; Thomas More
Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 551 (Sutton, J., concurring in part); Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 41;
Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786; Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d at 1135–36.
196 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b) (2006) (“No inference, implication, or presumption of legisla-
tive construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any
particular section or provision or portion of this title . . . .”).
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intended to be a tax.197  In addition, the Act did not make available to the
IRS the usual tax collection enforcement mechanisms of liens, levies, and
criminal proceedings.198
Finally, the lower courts agreed that the exaction was not intended or
designed to raise revenue.  Judge Vinson of the District Court for the North-
ern District of Florida observed that the Act did not “mention any revenue-
generating purpose that is to be served by the individual mandate pen-
alty.”199  Congress “failed to identify in the legislation any revenue that would
be raised from it, notwithstanding that at least seventeen other revenue-gen-
erating provisions were specifically so identified.”200  Judge Hudson of the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia insisted that “the notion
that the generation of revenue was a significant legislative objective is a trans-
parent afterthought.  The legislative purpose underlying this provision was
purely regulation of what Congress misperceived to be economic activity.”201
“No plausible argument” could be made that it had “‘the purpose of support-
ing the Government.’”202  Judge Kessler of the District Court for the District
of Columbia similarly maintained that “Congress did not intend the
mandatory payment . . . to act as a revenue-raising tax, but rather as a puni-
tive measure.”203  The Act’s legislative findings demonstrated that “the goal”
of the minimum coverage provision was “not to raise revenue, but to achieve
near-universal health care coverage by giving individuals the incentive to
maintain their health insurance under threat of penalty.”204  The Eleventh
Circuit concurred in this assessment,205 adding that the projection that the
Act would generate some $4 to 5 billion in annual revenue by the end of the
decade did not make the exaction a tax rather than a penalty, because the
Supreme Court had recognized in Kurth Ranch that “in our world of less than
perfect compliance, penalties generate revenue just as surely as taxes.”206
Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit agreed that the “central function of the
mandate was not to raise revenue” but instead “to change individual behavior
197 Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 552 (Sutton, J., concurring in part); Florida v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d at 1319–20; Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at
786; Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1136–37.
198 Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 552 (Sutton, J., concurring in part); Florida v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d at 1320; Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
199 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
200 Id. at 1139.
201 Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
202 Id. at 787 (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518
U.S. 213, 224 (1996)).
203 Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 40 (D.D.C. 2011).
204 Id. at 41.
205 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1317–18 (11th
Cir. 2011).
206 Id. at 1318.
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by requiring all qualified Americans to obtain medical insurance.”207  The
legislative findings said nothing about raising revenue, and a good deal about
bringing a large number of new consumers into the health insurance market.
To the extent that the Act raised revenue, its proponents would regard it as
unsuccessful.208  The fact that the minimum coverage provision was pre-
dicted to raise revenue of $4 billion per year did not “convert the penalty into
a tax,” for if the raising of revenue were sufficient to make an exaction a tax
for constitutional purposes then “every monetary penalty, no matter how reg-
ulatory or punitive, would be a tax.”209  For these reasons, the exaction was
not “a bona fide revenue raising measure enacted under the taxing power of
Congress.”210  Instead, “on its face,”211 it was “in form and substance,”212 “a
civil regulatory penalty and not a tax.”213
Lower court judges differed, however, on the status of the Child Labor
Tax Case.  Judge Wynn, in his concurring opinion in Liberty University v.
Geithner, cited the decision as an example of “cases from the 1920s and 1930s
suggest[ing] that taxes are either regulatory or revenue-raising and that the
former are unconstitutional.”214  But Judge Wynn maintained that more
recent cases, such as Sonzinsky, Sanchez, and Kahriger, demonstrated “that the
revenue-versus-regulatory distinction was short-lived and is now defunct.”215
Sonzinsky taught us that “ ‘[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory.  To some
extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as com-
pared with others not taxed.  But a tax is not any less a tax because it has a
regulatory effect . . . .’”216 Sanchez taught us that “a tax—regardless of its
label—‘does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or
even definitely deters the activities taxed.’”217  And Kahriger taught that “ ‘a
federal excise tax does not cease to be valid merely because it discourages or
deters the activities taxed.’”218  Earlier decisions such as McCray and Doremus
taught similar lessons.219  Judge Wynn remarked that in the 1974 case of Bob
207 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 551 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part).
208 Id. at 551–52.
209 Id. at 552 (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778
(1994) (“Criminal fines, civil penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes all  . . . generate govern-
ment revenues, impose fiscal burdens on individuals, and deter certain behavior.”)).
210 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 787 (E.D. Va. 2010).
211 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1140 (N.D.
Fla. 2010).
212 Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
213 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1320 (11th Cir.
2011).
214 Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 417 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J., concur-
ring), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012).
215 Id.
216 Id. (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)).
217 Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950)).
218 Id. at 417 (quoting United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953), overruled in part
by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)).
219 Id.
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Jones University v. Simon, “the Supreme Court recognized that, while in some
early cases it ‘drew what it saw at the time as distinctions between regulatory
and revenue-raising taxes,’ the Court ‘subsequently abandoned such distinc-
tions.’”220  Judge Wynn drew from this history the conclusion that “neither
an exaction’s label nor its regulatory intent or effect is germane to the consti-
tutional inquiry.”221  In modern taxing power cases, courts did not “look to
labels, regulatory intent, or regulatory effect.”222  The Child Labor Tax Case
and its few progeny were nothing more than a brief, ill-advised detour from
which the Court fortunately had backtracked.223
Judge Vinson also agreed that the Court had abandoned the distinction
between revenue-raising and regulatory taxes.  “It is true, as held in certain of
the early tax cases . . . that the Supreme Court once drew distinctions
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes.”224  But Sonzinsky, Sanchez, and
Bob Jones persuaded Judge Vinson that these distinctions “had a very short
shelf-life.”225  Judge Vinson therefore assumed that “Congress could have
used its broad taxing power to impose the exaction and that, if it had clearly
(or even arguably) intended to do so, then the exaction would have been
sustainable under its taxing authority.”226
The Eleventh Circuit did not directly address the status of the Child
Labor Tax Case, but suggested that the question of the individual mandate’s
constitutionality might have been different had the Act purported “on its
face” to be an exercise of the taxing power—if Congress had “expressly and
unmistakably indicated” that the provision was a tax.227  Under those circum-
stances, the court suggested, it would not matter that the tax was “‘burden-
some or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.’”228  In such a case
courts would not inquire into “‘the hidden motives which may move Con-
gress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it.’”229  But here
those principles were inapplicable, because the statute “on its face” imposed
a penalty rather than a tax.230  It was “in every important respect” a “ ‘punish-
ment for an unlawful act or omission,’ which defines the very ‘concept of
penalty.’”231
220 Id. (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974)).
221 Id. at 416.
222 Id. at 417.
223 Id. at 416–17.
224 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1132 (N.D.
Fla. 2010) (citations omitted).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 1133.
227 Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1319 (11th Cir.
2011).
228 Id. (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)).
229 Id. (quoting Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513–14).
230 Id.
231 Id. (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S.
213, 224 (1996)).
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By contrast, Judge Hudson made clear his view that the Child Labor Tax
Case and its progeny remained good law.  “Notwithstanding criticism by the
pen of some constitutional scholars,” he insisted,
[T]he constraining principles articulated in this line of cases, while perhaps
dormant, remains [sic] viable and applicable to the immediate dispute.
Although they have not been frequently employed in recent years, this
absence appears to be more a product of the unprecedented nature of the
legislation under review than an abandonment of established principles.232
In his concurring opinion in Thomas More Law Center, Judge Sutton likewise
maintained that it was “premature . . . to abandon the distinction between
taxes and penalties.”233  Judge Sutton rejected the Government’s contention
that the Supreme Court in Bob Jones had “‘abandoned’” the “‘distinction[ ]
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes.’”234  This language from Bob
Jones was “the purest of dicta, as the case involved the Anti-Injunction Act, not
the taxing power, and was not even necessary to the statutory holding.”235
Judge Sutton conceded that many of the cases adhering to the tax/penalty
distinction were “old,” but insisted that “cases of a certain age are just as likely
to rest on venerable principles as stale ones, particularly when there is a good
explanation for their vintage.”236  All of these decisions, Judge Sutton
observed, “pre-date the Court’s expansion of the commerce power, which
largely ‘rendered moot’ the need to worry about the tax/penalty distinc-
tion.”237  “Nonetheless,” Judge Sutton maintained, “the line between ‘reve-
nue production and mere regulation,’ described by Chief Justice Taft in the
Child Labor Tax Case, retains force today.  Look no further than Kurth Ranch,”
he advised his readers, “a 1994 decision that post-dated Bob Jones and that
relied on the Child Labor Tax Case to hold that what Congress had labeled a
tax amounted to an unconstitutional penalty under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.”238
232 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010).
233 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 553 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part).
234 Id. (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974)).
235 Id.; see also Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 741 n.12 (“Even if such distinctions have
merit, it would not assist petitioner, since its challenge is aimed at the imposition of federal
income, FICA, and FUTA taxes which clearly are intended to raise revenue.”); Cuccinelli,
728 F. Supp. 2d at 784–85 (noting that the Bob Jones University footnote is dicta).
236 Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 553 (Sutton, J., concurring in part).
237 Id. (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 846 (3d ed.
2000)).
238 Id. (citation omitted); see also Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (noting that Kurth
Ranch “restated with approval” the proposition in the Child Labor Tax Case).
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III. TAXING POWER ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The briefs for the parties submitted to the Supreme Court scarcely
touched on the taxing power precedents.239  The Government’s brief
devoted little more than a page to their discussion, and did not even mention
the Child Labor Tax Case.240  The Solicitor General pointed out that the mini-
mum coverage provision would “plainly be ‘productive of some revenue,’ and
thus satisfies a key attribute of taxation.”241  The Eleventh Circuit’s percep-
tion that the goal of the minimum coverage provision was to reduce the num-
ber of uninsured people rather than to raise revenue was inapt, for Sanchez
taught that a tax “‘does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed.’”242 Sonzinsky and
Kahriger reminded us that “ ‘[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory,’ in
that ‘it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared
with others not taxed.’”243  As long as the statute was “‘productive of some
revenue,’” Congress could “exercise its taxing powers irrespective of any ‘col-
lateral inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax.’”244  Thus,
as the Sanchez Court had observed, “ ‘[f]rom the beginning of our govern-
ment, the courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral
intent of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly
addressed to their accomplishment.’”245 Bob Jones had announced that the
239 The oral arguments likewise devoted scant attention to the taxing power issue.
Solicitor General Verrilli’s colloquy on the subject comprised only eight pages of the tran-
script and only fleetingly considered the precedents.  Transcript of Oral Argument at
44–52, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
Counsel for the Respondents Paul Clement’s discussion of the issue consumed less than a
page. Id. at 78–79.
240 See Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 54–55, Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).  The precedents were
discussed more extensively in Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 7–15, Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); id. at 10, 13 (arguing that the Court had
“discredited” its “Lochner-era decisions” on the scope of the taxing power); Brief of Service
Employees International Union and Change to Win as Amici Curiae Addressing the Mini-
mum Coverage Provision Issue and Supporting Petitioners and Reversal at 20–28, Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); id. at 22, 26–27
(dismissing the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny as “discredited Lochner-era cases”).
Notably, none of the amici opposing the ACA produced analyses of the taxing power issue
challenging these contentions.
241 Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), supra note 240, at 54  (quoting
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937)).
242 Id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950)).
243 Id. (quoting Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513) (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S.
22, 24 (1953), overruled in part by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)).
244 Id. at 55 (quoting Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514).
245 Id. (quoting Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45).
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Court had “long ‘abandoned the view that bright-line distinctions exist
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes.’”246
The respondents argued that Congress had called the exaction a penalty
“because it is, in fact, a penalty.”247  It did not matter that the exaction would
be housed in the Internal Revenue Code and would be productive of some
revenue.  The Code contained a number of civil penalties, and such penalties
did generate some revenue, but that did not make them taxes.248  The
respondents insisted that the shared responsibility payment should be consid-
ered a penalty even had it been labeled a tax, because it was “a monetary
exaction . . . imposed as a consequence for failure to abide by a separate legal
command,” namely, the command to acquire and maintain minimum essen-
tial coverage.249  The Child Labor Tax Case established that “Congress may not
use its tax power to circumvent the Constitution’s enumeration of limited
regulatory powers by ‘enact[ing] a detailed measure of complete regulation of
[a] subject and enforc[ing] it by a so-called tax upon departures from it.’”250
That precedent continued to stand for the proposition that “Congress may
not ‘break down all constitutional limitation [on its] powers . . . and com-
pletely wipe out the sovereignty of the states’ by invoking its tax power to
enforce commands that it lacks the authority to impose.”251  Because the
ACA “imposes a command that is unprecedented and invokes a power that is
both unbounded and not included among the limited and enumerated pow-
ers granted to Congress,” the respondents concluded, it was “therefore
unconstitutional.”252
Perhaps in light of the respondents’ reliance on the Child Labor Tax Case,
the Government did feel the necessity to engage the precedent in its reply
brief.  The Solicitor General did so by denying that the shared responsibility
payment constituted “punishment for an unlawful act,”253 and by identifying
three features of the exaction that distinguished it from the Child Labor Tax.
First, it was “tied to income” and “due only for months in which coverage is
not maintained,” unlike the Child Labor Tax, which was not “‘proportioned
in any degree to the extent or frequency of the departures.’”254  Second, the
shared responsibility payment contained no scienter requirement.255  And
246 Id. (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 743 n.17 (1974)).
247 Brief for State Respondents on the Minimum Coverage Provision at 61, Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); see also id. at
58–60.
248 Id. at 60–61.
249 Id. at 57–59.
250 Id. at 58 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)).
251 Id. at 63 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38).
252 Id. at 64.
253 Reply Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), supra note 240, at 22.
254 Id. at 23 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 50–51, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(No. 11-398).
255 Reply Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), supra note 240, at 22; see
also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 254, at 50–51.
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third, enforcement was to be handled solely by the IRS, rather than in part by
the Department of Labor or some other government agency unconnected to
the collection of revenue.256  Those distinctions would prove critical to the
Supreme Court’s resolution of the taxing power issue.
IV. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND THE TAXING POWER
Chief Justice Roberts was prepared to overlook the drafting features of
the statute that had persuaded the lower courts that the shared responsibility
payment could not be treated as a tax.  It was “well established that if a statute
has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts
should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”257  Thus, “ ‘every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitu-
tionality.’”258  The Chief Justice concluded that “[t]he most straightforward
reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insur-
ance.”259  Nevertheless, it was “necessary to ask whether the Government’s
alternative reading of the statute—that it only imposes a tax on those without
insurance—is a reasonable one.”260  The question was not whether the Gov-
ernment’s reading was “the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but
only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”261  “Granting the Act the full mea-
sure of deference owed to federal statutes,” Chief Justice Roberts concluded,
the mandate could be interpreted as imposing a tax.262
This resolution of the statutory construction issue accordingly led the
Chief Justice to the question of whether the individual mandate presented a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing power.  Unlike some of the lower
courts, both Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting Justices treated the
Child Labor Tax Case as a precedent with continuing authority.  Rather than
overruling the Child Labor Tax Case, Chief Justice Roberts sought in several
respects to distinguish the Child Labor Tax from the shared responsibility
payment imposed by the ACA.  This section examines each of those
distinctions.
A. The Burden of the Exaction
First, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Child Labor Tax “imposed an
exceedingly heavy burden—10 percent of a company’s net income—on
256 Reply Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), supra note 240, at 22; see
also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 254, at 50–51.  These features were similarly
emphasized in Brief of Service Employees International Union and Change to Win as
Amici Curiae Addressing the Minimum Coverage Provision Issue and Supporting Petition-
ers and Reversal, supra note 240, at 24–26.
257 Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).
258 Id. at 2594 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
259 Id. at 2593.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 2594 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
262 Id.
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those who employed children, no matter how small their infraction.”263  By
contrast, under the ACA, “for most Americans the amount due will be far less
than the price of insurance, and, by statute, it can never be more.  It may
often be a reasonable financial decision to make the payment rather than
purchase insurance, unlike the ‘prohibitory’ financial punishment” imposed
by the Child Labor Tax.264  Chief Justice Roberts recognized that the “shared
responsibility payment,” like the Child Labor Tax, was “plainly designed” to
affect behavior.265  “But taxes that seek to influence conduct are nothing
new,” he observed, and as Sonzinsky pointed out, “[e]very tax is in some mea-
sure regulatory.  To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to
the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.”266  The fact that the
ACA “seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance [there-
fore did] not mean that it [could not] be a valid exercise of the taxing
power.”267  Thus, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to suggest, the fact that the
Child Labor Tax sought to influence conduct was not its fatal flaw.  Instead,
its problem was that the levy it imposed in order to do so was “prohibitory.”
Chief Justice Taft did describe the Child Labor Tax as “prohibitory,” but
that seems to have been putting it too strongly.268  There can be little doubt
that the tax reduced the employment of child labor,269 but it clearly did not
prevent such labor.  Recall that the Child Labor Tax imposed the excise on
firms employing children under the age of sixteen in mines and quarries,
and on firms employing children under eighteen in manufacturing enter-
prises.270  The 1920 Census, taken the year after the tax went into effect,
showed 7,191 children under the age of sixteen employed in the “Extraction
of minerals” and 9,473 children under fourteen employed in “Manufacturing
and mechanical industries.”271  The 1910 Census had shown 18,090 children
under sixteen employed in the “Extraction of minerals,” meaning that there
were 10,899 fewer children so employed in 1920.272  The 1910 Census data
on children employed in “Manufacturing and mechanical industries” is less
263 Id. at 2595.
264 Id. at 2595–96 (footnote omitted).
265 Id. at 2596.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Child Labor Tax Case, 259, U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
269 See Thomas Reed Powell, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution, 1 N.C. L. REV. 61,
69 (1922) (“No one can doubt that such a law would have a depressing effect on child
labor.  Miners and manufacturers would naturally prefer to enjoy this ten per cent of their
net income in pursuits of their own rather than to devote it to the more or less laudable
enterprises of the national government.  Thus children would be likely to find the factory
doors barred against them except when operators would figure that they might be hired at
sufficiently low wages to make a saving in labor cost greater than ten per cent of antici-
pated net income.”).
270 Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919).
271 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, TAKEN IN
THE YEAR 1920, at 477.
272 Id.
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granular, reporting only that there were 260,932 children under the age of
sixteen so employed.273  The 1920 Census reflects such employment of
185,337 children, indicating a reduction in this larger category of 75,595.274
The data do not reveal how much of this reduction in manufacturing
employment should be allocated to children under fourteen.  Nor is it clear
to what extent these reductions in the employment of children should be
attributed to the effect of the tax, and how much to other factors, such as
significant improvements between 1910 and 1920 in the standards imposed
by state child labor laws and state school attendance laws; advances in mecha-
nization requiring the operation of skilled older workers; the “growth of
organized labor,” which opposed competition from cheap child labor; and
changes in parental attitudes toward child labor.275  What is clear, however, is
that the Child Labor Tax did not eliminate the forms of labor that triggered
its application.  As the 1922 Report of the Chief of the Children’s Bureau put
it,
The returns from the 1920 census, taken at the beginning of a period of
industrial depression and with the Federal child labor tax law discouraging
their employment, show fewer children under 14 and under 16 gainfully
employed than did the census of 1910; but the decline is much less than it
should be . . . .276
As the New York World editorialized when the tax was being considered by
Congress:
[W]e can see no objection except that the proposed Federal tax is too small.
Ten per cent, on the value of the products of enslaved childhood is not
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 See WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN 159 (1970); WOOD, supra note
101, at 251–52.  Professor Trattner observes that “[b]y the end of 1909 only four Southern
states (and the District of Columbia) had a minimum working age of fourteen for factories.
All the others, including the Carolinas—the two leading cotton textile-producing states in
the region—retained only a twelve-year age limit.” TRATTNER, supra, at 99.  As of 1912,
twenty-two states “still permitted children under fourteen to work in factories,” and “thirty
states still allowed boys under sixteen to work in mines.” Id. at 115.  But by 1914, Professor
Wood reports, thirty-six states “had a minimum-age requirement of fourteen years for
industrial employment.” WOOD, supra note 101, at 24 n.8.  On that front, “success had in
large measure been attained. . . .  Except for conspicuously backward areas, the worst hor-
rors were almost gone.” Id. at 23.  And as Clarke Chambers notes, “[e]ven in the South . . .
amendments to state laws had been secured after 1916 which brought it closer in line with
the rest of the nation.” CLARKE A. CHAMBERS, SEEDTIME OF REFORM 32 (1963).  As Professor
Wood reports, in February of 1919 the North Carolina legislature enacted a fourteen-year
minimum-age standard for industrial employment.  “The last of the southern textile states
to hold out against national standards of regulation with respect to excluding grade-school-
age children from industrial employment had now come into line.” WOOD, supra note 101,
at 223–24.  For a detailed summary of the status of state child labor laws in 1919, see JULIA
C. LATHROP, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHILDREN’S YEAR LEAFLET NO. 13,
BUREAU PUB. NO. 58, THE STATES AND CHILD LABOR (1919).
276 JAMES J. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE CHIEF TO THE SEC’Y OF LABOR 12 (1922).
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enough to emancipate the youth of the South or to curb the greed of its
employers or to correct the depraved public sentiment against which the
levy is aimed.277
The fact that the tax was not in a strong sense “prohibitory” is reflected
in the fact that it actually generated revenue.  For the fiscal year ending June
30, 1920, the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue indi-
cated $2,380.20 in revenue from the tax, derived from assessments in Dela-
ware, Maryland, and South Carolina.278  As the Commissioner explained,
“[l]ittle tax could be collected during 1920, as the law provides that the tax-
payer shall be given two months after the completion of his business year in
which to make a return of the amount of tax due.  Furthermore, an audit of
the return is necessary in every instance.”279  Accordingly, some of the taxes
owed due to employment of children during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1920, were in fact collected during the following fiscal year.  This was
reflected in the Commissioner’s report for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1921, which reported revenue from the tax totaling $24,223.67, derived from
assessments in Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia.280  And for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1922, the Commissioner reported revenue of $15,224.99, derived from
assessments in Delaware, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wyoming.281  The tax
277 Quoted in A New Weapon Against Child Labor, LITERARY DIG., Jan. 4, 1919, at 14.
278 U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVE-
NUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1920, NO. 2875, at 16, 70–71 (1920) [hereinafter
1920 ANNUAL REPORT].
279 Id. at 20.
280 U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVE-
NUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1921, NO. 2896, at 16, 64–65 (1921) [hereinafter
1921 ANNUAL REPORT].  These figures, denominated “Receipts,” presumably do not include
any amounts that may have been assessed but the collection of which may have been
enjoined, as was the case in Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922), where the lower court in
1921 enjoined collection of $2,098 against the Vivian Cotton Mills in November of 1920.
Id. at 19; WOOD, supra note 101, at 265.
281 U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVE-
NUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1922, NO. 2911, at 70–71 (1922) [hereinafter
1922 ANNUAL REPORT].  It seems unlikely that all of these taxes were paid under protest
with the taxpayers anticipating that the Court would invalidate the law and award them a
refund.  Commentators generally anticipated that the law would be upheld on the basis of
existing precedents and expressed surprise when it was not. See A New Campaign Against
Child Labor, 120 THE OUTLOOK, 514, 518 (1918) (expressing optimism that the Court
would uphold the law); David Brady, A Forecast of the Supreme Court Decision on the Child Labor
Tax Law, THE AM. CHILD 115, 115–17 (1919) (“[I]f the decision in the Doremus case is
followed, when the Child Labor Tax Law is presented for the consideration of the
Supreme Court—probably next October—that Court will certainly hold that Congress can
do under its taxing power what that same Court about a year ago held that Congress could
not do under its power to regulate interstate commerce.”);  Child Labor and the Constitution,
114 THE NATION 638, 639 (1922) (finding the Child Labor Tax decision “surprising” in
view of the precedents); Current Decisions, Constitutional Law—Federal Taxing Power—Regula-
tion of Child Labor by Taxation, 31 YALE L.J. 894, 894 (1922) (stating that “[t]he oleomarga-
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thus raised more annual revenue than did the provision of the National Fire-
arms Tax unanimously upheld in Sonzinsky,282 which in 1934 was paid by
twenty-seven dealers resulting in revenue of $5,400, and in 1935 was paid by
twenty-two dealers resulting in revenue of $4,400.283  Receipts under the
Child Labor Tax also exceeded collections under the Marihuana Tax of
rine case and similar authorities . . . were supposed to forecast the opposite conclusion” in
the Child Labor Tax Case); W.F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional
Law, 29 YALE L.J. 137, 151 (1919) (“[T]he result sought in vain under the commerce
power . . . is likely to be accomplished under a broadly construed taxing power.”); Federal
Regulation of Child Labor, 22 L. NOTES 205, 205 (1919) (“It is difficult to see on what ground
the validity of the law can be attacked. . . . That the ultimate effect of the enactment is to
prohibit, rather than to raise revenue, is no objection to its validity . . . .”); Raymond G.
Fuller, A Quest of Constitutionality, 7 THE CHILD LAB. BULL. 207, 213 (1918) (assuring read-
ers that there were “many reasons for believing that such a [tax] bill, if passed by Congress,
will meet the test of constitutionality in the courts”); Raymond G. Fuller, Child Labor and the
War, 58 THE AM. REV. OF REVS 500, 501 (1918) (stating that “Congress probably can pro-
hibit child labor by taxing its products”); Nat’l Child Labor Comm., Editorial and News
Notes, 7 THE CHILD LAB. BULL. 150, 151 (1918) (“[A] federal child-labor measure, based on
the taxing power of Congress, offers a constitutional means of doing to child labor prod-
ucts (so far as mines, quarries, canneries and factories are concerned) exactly what was
done to state bank notes, artificially colored oleomargarine and poisonous phosphorus
matches—viz., tax them out of existence.”); Planning a New Child Labor Law, 40 THE SURVEY
323, 323–24 (1918) (suggesting imposition of an excise tax on child-made goods, relying
on the precedents of such regulatory taxes imposed on colored oleomargarine and white
phosphorus matches); Thomas Reed Powell, The Child-Labor Decision, 106 THE NATION 730,
731 (1918) (“If Congress . . . should impose a special excise on making goods with the
labor of children, the Supreme Court could not defeat its purpose without directly aban-
doning the case which sustained the excise on oleomargarine.”); Recent Decisions, Constitu-
tional Law: Child Labor Law, 10 CAL. L. REV. 95, 95–96 (1921) (“The state bank-tax case and
the oleomargarine tax case throw grave doubt upon the correctness of the decision [of the
district court invalidating the Child Labor Tax].”); Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law—
Taxation—Products of Child Labor, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 370 (1922) (“It may be that the
Supreme Court, in order to protect state rights, will . . . overrule McCray v. United States . . .
and the other taxation cases, and hold the statute under consideration unconstitutional
because its primary purpose is to control manufacturing conditions.  But those cases are
still law and the district court [that invalidated the law] should have followed them.”);
Henry M. Bates, Comment, Child Labor Law Case—Commerce Power of Congress and Reserved
Powers of the States, 17 MICH. L. REV. 83, 87 (1918) (“The scientific and popular opinion is so
strong for the prohibition of child labor in this country that it is certain to be obtained
sooner or later.  It would seem clear that this object may be obtained by an exercise of the
taxing power of Congress under the doctrine laid down in McCray v. U. S. . . . .”); T.W.S.,
Comment, Regulating Child Labor by Federal Taxation, 31 YALE L.J. 310, 314 (1922) (“Con-
ceivably the Supreme Court may decide that Congress has gone too far in the Child Labor
Tax Law because the indirect result is to regulate a local matter.  But to reach this decision
they must overrule the McCray case . . . . It does not seem likely that they will do so.”).
282 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 511, 514 (1937).
283 Id. at 514 n.1 (citing U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM’R
OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1935, NO. 3075, at 129–131
(1935) [hereinafter 1935 ANNUAL REPORT]; U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1936, NO. 3082,
at 139–41 (1936) [hereinafter 1936 ANNUAL REPORT]).
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1937—unanimously upheld in Sanchez284—which, for example, produced
revenue of $4,538 in 1939 and $4,703 in 1940.285
Thus, the taxes that the Court has upheld cannot be distinguished from
the Child Labor Tax on the ground that the former have produced “some
revenue”286 while the latter did not.  The Child Labor Tax did produce
“some revenue,” indeed more than was produced by some of the taxes that
have been upheld.  Contrary to the view sometimes expressed, therefore, it is
plain that the supposed distinction between constitutional revenue-raising
and unconstitutional regulatory taxes287 was never an organizing feature of
the Court’s taxing power jurisprudence—for the paradigmatic unconstitu-
tional regulatory tax—the Child Labor Tax—was itself a revenue-raiser.  If
the Child Labor Tax Case is still good law, therefore, it must be true that the
production of “some revenue” is at best a necessary condition, and not a
sufficient condition, for a tax to be constitutional.288  Indeed, Chief Justice
Roberts’s own formulation indicates that this is his understanding—he
284 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 46 (1950).
285 U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVE-
NUE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1940, NO. 3110, at 26 (1940) [hereinafter 1940
ANNUAL REPORT].
286 Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514.
287 See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 417 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J.,
concurring), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679 (discussing Supreme Court tax cases from the 1920s
and 1930s); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1131–32 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting the “revenue-raising” versus “regulatory” test for
taxes); Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Mini-
mum Coverage Provision), supra note 240, at 10 (“The Court has . . . ‘abandoned’ its
earlier ‘distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes . . . .’” (quoting Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974))); Brief of Service Employees Interna-
tional Union and Change to Win as Amici Curiae Addressing the Minimum Coverage Provi-
sion Issue and Supporting Petitioners and Reversal, supra note 240, at 27 (“[T]his Court
has ‘abandoned’ the Lochner-era ‘distinction[ ] between regulatory and revenue-raising
taxes.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 741 n.12)); Cooter &
Siegel, supra note 25, at 1213 (explaining that decisions from the 1920s and 1930s “distin-
guished regulatory exactions, which the Court deemed to be penalties, from revenue-rais-
ing exactions, which the Court regarded as taxes”); id. at 1218 (referring to “the pre-1937
Court’s distinction between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes”); see also Bob Jones Univ.,
416 U.S. at 741 n.12 (noting a former distinction between regulatory and revenue-raising
taxes).
288 Cf. Liberty Univ., 671 F.3d at 416 (Wynn, J., concurring) (“As long as a statute is
‘productive of some revenue,’ Congress may exercise its taxing power without ‘collateral
inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect [of the statute in question].’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514)); id. at 418 (“The amount of revenue
raised is irrelevant: A tax does not cease to be one ‘even though the revenue obtained is
obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.’  Instead, the
measure must simply be ‘productive of some revenue.’” (quoting Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44;
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514)); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 48 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction and not deciding the merits) (“[T]he Taxing
Clause authorizes regulatory taxes, at least so long as the tax raises some revenue, as it does
here.” (citing Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44–45; Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513–14)), abrogated by Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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observes that the “‘[s]hared responsibility payment’”289 bears “the essential
feature of any tax: it produces at least some revenue for the Government.”290
The Child Labor Tax also exhibited this “essential feature.”
Indeed, there is a feature of the Child Labor Tax that may in some
instances have made it even less coercive of behavior than were some of the
taxes that the Court has upheld—for under the Child Labor Tax, it was possi-
ble to engage in the activity that was subject to taxation and nevertheless
escape payment of the tax.  This is because the Child Labor Tax imposed an
excise of ten percent on the “net profits” of the firm employing child
labor.291  In computing the net profits of the business, the statute allowed
deductions for a variety of expenses, including the “cost of raw materials;”
interest paid on loans; taxes; uncompensated casualty losses; depreciation;
and “[r]unning expenses, including rentals, cost of repairs, and mainte-
nance, heat, power, insurance, management, and a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensations for personal services actually rendered.”292
The availability of these deductions, which reduced net profits, provided
opportunities for strategic tax avoidance.  An entity could elect to incur or to
pay deductible costs—such as acquisition of raw materials, the making of
repairs, the purchase of equipment, the expansion of plant capacity, the pay-
ment of bills and taxes, and the like—into years in which child labor was
employed and in which significant profits were made or anticipated.  In addi-
tion, and most importantly, the deductibility of reasonable payments of salary
made it possible for closely-held businesses to compensate owners and family
members by placing them on the payroll and thereby reducing the firm’s
exposure to the Child Labor Tax.  Just as closely-held corporations routinely
have compensated their shareholders through deductible salary rather than
taxable dividends in order to avoid two levels of taxation on the company’s
income,293 so the Child Labor Tax permitted a company employing child
labor to reduce or eliminate its taxable “net profits” by paying out “reasona-
ble” compensation to employee-owners and family members.
An examination of the Annual Reports of the Commissioner for Internal
Revenue suggests that at least some companies employing child labor
engaged in such strategic tax avoidance.  For the fiscal year ending June 30,
1920, the Commissioner reported that “[d]uring the year liability to tax has
been established in the following States: Arizona, California, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
289 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (alteration in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
290 Id. (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 n.4 (1953), overruled in part by
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
291 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 1200, 40 Stat. 1057, 1138 (1919).
292 Id. § 1201.
293 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 158–59
(12th ed. 2012).
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Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.”294  Yet neither the 1920 nor
the 1921 report reflects any tax actually collected from Arizona, California,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,, Oklahoma,, or
Washington;295 and of these states, only entities in New Jersey and Oklahoma
paid any such taxes for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922.296  This means
that, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, there were at least eight and
probably as many as ten states in which the Commissioner “established” “lia-
bility to tax,” and yet from which no taxes were in fact paid.  Assuming that
“liability to tax” implies that all of the prerequisites to taxation under the law
had been established, this suggests that it turned out that for the years in
question there was no “net income” on which to impose the excise.
The possibility that firms employing child labor engaged in such strate-
gic tax avoidance is also suggested by the size of some of the collections
reflected in the Commissioner for Internal Revenues Annual Reports.  The
Drexel Furniture Company’s payment in 1922 of $6,312.79297 was on the
high side, and thus one can understand why Chief Justice Taft and his col-
leagues may have regarded it as a “heavy exaction.”298  But had the Justices
been aware of the size of collections in other districts, they might not have
believed that the tax was invariably so burdensome.  For example, the 1920
Annual Report reflects a collection from Delaware of $59.64,299 while the
1922 Annual Report reflects collections from Maryland of $99.20, from Wyo-
ming of $79.69, from Mississippi of $50.24, from Delaware of $10.44, and
from Tennessee of $9.43.300  Many of the other collections reported were
under $1,000.301  Either through lack of financial success or as a result of
attentive planning, a number of firms employing child labor appear to have
reduced their tax liability to modest or nominal sums, or to have eliminated
such liability altogether.  For a number of firms employing child labor, then,
the Child Labor Tax may have been—as Professor George Cooper once
famously said of the estate tax—a “voluntary tax.”302  For these firms, it may
294 1920 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 278, at 20.
295 See id. at 70–71; 1921 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 280, at 64–65.
296 1922 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 281, at 70–71.
297 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 34 (1922).
298 Id. at 36.
299 1920 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 278, at 70.
300 1922 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 281, at 70–71.
301 See 1920 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 278, at 70–71 (Maryland, $341.42); 1921
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 280, at 64–65 (Ohio, $298.02; Pennsylvania, $939.06; Tennes-
see, $960.36; Texas, $325.16; Vermont, $151.31); 1922 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 281, at
70–71 (Missouri, $412.82; Oklahoma, $562.08).  The largest collections reported, in addi-
tion to the tax paid by the Drexel Furniture Company in 1922, were $1,979.14 in South
Carolina in 1920, 1920 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 278, at 70–71; $1,271.09 in Georgia,
$2,229.80 in Mississippi, $16,372.87 in North Carolina, and $1,676.00 in Virginia in 1921,
1921 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 280, at 64–65; and $6,463.18 in New Jersey, $6,312.79 in
North Carolina, and $1,225.13 in Pennsylvania in 1922, 1922 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
281, at 70–71.
302 George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoid-
ance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 221 (1977).
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have been, as Chief Justice Roberts puts it, “a reasonable financial deci-
sion”303 to employ child labor and to pay whatever tax, if any, might result.
Moreover, child labor reformers apparently did not believe that the tax
could be salvaged by lowering the rate to make it less “prohibitory” or by
tailoring it to be more proportional to the extent of the offense.  Chief Jus-
tice Taft had observed that
[i]f an employer departs from this prescribed course of business, he is to pay
to the Government one-tenth of his entire net income in the business for a
full year.  The amount is not to be proportioned in any degree to the extent
or frequency of the departures, but is to be paid by the employer in full
measure whether he employs five hundred children for a year, or employs
only one for a day.”304
Chief Justice Roberts similarly noted that the full ten percent levy was
imposed on employers “no matter how small their infraction.”305  A reduced
or more proportioned rate presumably would have had less of a deterrent
effect on some potential employers of child labor than would a ten percent
excise on annual net profits.  But in the immediate wake of the Court’s deci-
sion invalidating the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act in Hammer v.
Dagenhart,306 at least two members of the national legislature proposed that
Congress adopt such legislation.  On June 11, 1918, Republican Representa-
tive William E. Mason of Illinois suggested that were Congress “to tax all peo-
ple who employ children under 16 in the mines or under 14 in the factories
$2 per day for each day for each child so employed, it may have a healthy
effect in bringing about this much-hoped-for reform.”307  Mason reported
that he had proposed such an amendment to the revenue bill to the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, and “hope[d] for its favorable consideration.”308
This suggestion was not revived in the wake of the Child Labor Tax decision.
Nor did Congress resuscitate the bill introduced on July 11, 1918, by Senator
Irvine L. Lenroot, Republican of Wisconsin.  Lenroot’s proposal—“[a] bill
. . . to provide increased revenue”—would have imposed on enterprises
employing children in violation of the Keating-Owen standards “an excise tax
of five per centum upon the entire net profits received . . . from the sale or
disposition of the product.”309  The idea of lower or more closely tailored
rates had occurred to reformers even before the Child Labor Tax had been
303 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012).
304 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922).
305 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
306 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
307 56 CONG. REC. 461 (1918).
308 Id.  Mason would offer such an amendment on the floor on April 11, 1921, with
H.R. 110, “A bill to amend the revenue laws of the United States,” would have imposed a
tax of two dollars per day on enterprises employing persons under the age of sixteen in any
mine or quarry in the United States, or employing persons under the age of fourteen in
any mill, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment in the United States.
The bill was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.  H.R. 110, 67th Cong. (1921);
61 CONG. REC. 89 (1921).
309 56 CONG. REC. 8964 (1918).
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enacted; but in the wake of the Court’s decision, they no longer regarded
such measures as viable options.
B. Scienter and Enforcement
Chief Justice Roberts also offered two other distinctions between the
ACA and the Child Labor Tax.  First, he observed that the Child Labor Tax
contained a scienter requirement, imposing the exaction “only on those who
knowingly employed underage laborers.”310  “Such scienter requirements,”
he explained, “are typical of punitive statutes, because Congress often wishes
to punish only those who intentionally break the law.”311  By contrast, the
Chief Justice noted, “the individual mandate contains no scienter require-
ment.”312  Second, the Chief Justice observed that the Child Labor “‘tax’ was
enforced in part by the Department of Labor, an agency responsible for pun-
ishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue.”313  The ACA’s “shared
responsibility payment,”314 however, “is collected solely by the IRS through
the normal means of taxation—except that the Service is not allowed to use
those means most suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as criminal
prosecution.”315
It is true that these features distinguish the shared responsibility pay-
ment from the excise imposed by the Child Labor Tax.  But child labor
reformers in the 1920s do not appear to have regarded these distinctions as
significant.  They did not believe that the Child Labor Tax could be revised
and made constitutional by removing the scienter requirement, or by moving
enforcement entirely into the Department of the Treasury, or by depriving
the Treasury of the means of enforcement most suggestive of a punitive sanc-
tion.  Instead, these reformers read the Court’s decision to imply that the
problems with the statute ran much deeper.  They believed that the Justices
had taken the possibility of national regulation of child labor through taxa-
tion off the table.  Shortly after the Child Labor Tax Case was decided, the New
York Tribune reported the “widely held” view of congressmen that “it will be
difficult, if not impossible, to enact a measure which will stand the test of the
courts,”316 and several commentators on the decision maintained that the
310 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 2596.  To this the dissenting Justices responded,
The last of the feeble arguments in favor of petitioners that we will address is the
contention that what this statute repeatedly calls a penalty is in fact a tax because
it contains no scienter requirement.  The presence of such a requirement suggests
a penalty—though one can imagine a tax imposed only on willful action; but the
absence of such a requirement does not suggest a tax.  Penalties for absolute-liabil-
ity offenses are commonplace.
Id. at 2654 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
313 Id. at 2595 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1922)).
314 Id.
315 Id. at 2596.
316 See Ban on Child Labor Bills in Supreme Court Decision, N.Y. TRIB., May 17, 1922, at 4.
2013] N F I B V . S E B E L I U S –  transformation  of  taxing  power 171
only remaining alternative was a constitutional amendment authorizing con-
gressional regulation of child labor.317  Felix Frankfurter, writing in the
pages of The New Republic, asked, “The door to the Federal action having now
been twice shut, what are we to do about child labor, particularly in the stub-
born black spots of the South?  In my judgment further Federal legislation,
under the existing Constitution, is unavailing . . . .”318  That summer, “the
Permanent Conference for the Abolition of Child Labor, representing some
317 See TRATTNER, supra note 275, at 163 (“[M]any citizens felt that constitutional
reform was the only alternative.”); W.A. Shumaker, State Child Labor Laws, 26 L. NOTES 185,
185 (1923) (“Congress has done its utmost, enacting a statute under the commerce power
and later one under the taxing power, but both have been held to be invalid.  No possibil-
ity of federal action remains except through a constitutional amendment . . . .”); The Pro-
posed Child Labor Amendment, 56 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 385, 389 (1924) (“Since the Supreme
Court twice decided Congress did not have the power, under the Constitution, to put a
stop to child labor, the only recourse was to submit to the several states an amendment to
the Constitution specifically granting Congress the right to regulate child labor.”).  The
view that a federal child labor amendment to the Constitution was the only means by which
Congress might be enabled to regulate the employment of children in the states was
shared by later historians. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING
AMERICA 179 (1993) (“The Court’s decisions posed the issue in its starkest form: either
Congress must give up its attempts to outlaw or penalize child labor or it must use the
amending process to establish an unambiguous power to do so.”); BICKEL, supra note 24, at
15 (“The Court had just made an end—an unmistakable, final end—to efforts to obtain
federal action against child labor.”); id. at 18 (stating that “the heavy gate of the Court . . .
clanged shut for a generation against federal efforts to root out child labor”); CHAMBERS,
supra note 275, at 29 (stating that after the Child Labor Tax Case, “[a]ll forms of federal
action, apparently, were null and void”); DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS 256
(1996) (“After their second Supreme Court defeat, advocates of federal child labor reform
lacked any practical alternative to a constitutional amendment.”); TRATTNER, supra note
275, at 142 (explaining that in the Child Labor Tax Case, the Court ruled “that it was impos-
sible under the Constitution for Congress or the federal government to correct the injus-
tice”); WOOD, supra note 101, at 280 (noting that with the Hammer and the Child Labor Tax
Case, “[t]he doctrine of limited purposes . . . was erected into a well-nigh impenetrable
barrier against the exercise of major federal powers for influencing the course of economic
development”); cf. J.F. Lawson, Child Labor and the Constitution, 56 AM. L. REV. 733, 733–34
(1922) (contending that child labor is “involuntary servitude” that Congress may “prohibit”
under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, and that such legislation would be pref-
erable to a Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution); Joseph R. Long, Federal Police
Regulation by Taxation, 9 VA. L. REV. 81, 91, 97 (1922) (contending that a constitutional
amendment was “not needed,” as “most of the States had adopted child labor laws and
were making rapid progress toward satisfactory legislation on this subject[,]” and as such a
child labor amendment “would place still another burden on our already overloaded gov-
ernment at Washington”).  The text of Lawson’s proposed bill and a brief in support,
along with an endorsement from Samuel Gompers, may be found at Child Labor: Hearing
before the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives on H.J. Res. 327, 67th Cong. 5–11
(1922) [hereinafter 1922 House Hearing].
318 Felix Frankfurter, Child Labor and the Court, 26 THE NEW REPUBLIC 248, 249 (1922).
Thomas Parkinson obliquely suggested the possibility that a taxing statute revised in some
unspecified manner might pass constitutional muster, but predicted that “proponents of
child labor legislation . . . will probably prefer to seek an amendment to the Constitution
which will make possible what two successive congresses have by large majorities declared
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twenty-five national groups with a variety of political and social views . . .
decided that the only way to eliminate child labor was by amending the Con-
stitution.”319  The board of the National Child Labor Committee concurred,
concluding that there was “‘no opportunity to secure legislation regulating
child labor by the federal authorities under the present Constitution,’” and
“endors[ing] a resolution favoring an active campaign for amendment.”320
That December, President Warren G. Harding wrote in his second annual
message to Congress,
Twice Congress has attempted the correction of the evils incident to child
employment.  The decision of the Supreme Court has put this problem
outside the proper domain of Federal regulation until the Constitution is so
amended as to give the Congress indubitable authority.  I recommend the
submission of such an amendment.321
When the House Judiciary Committee reported back such an amend-
ment in early 1923, its report concluded that in Hammer and the Child Labor
Tax Case the Court had “made the issue clear; either we give up the plan of a
Federal minimum and rely solely upon the States, or we undertake to secure
a Federal amendment definitely giving to Congress the power to pass a child
labor law, since the Supreme Court has found it does not now have that
power.”322  When the Senate Judiciary Committee reported on a similar
amendment the following day,323 Illinois Republican Senator Joseph Medill
McCormick insisted that without such an amendment Congress would be
powerless to combat the evil of child labor: “Unless Congress be empowered
by a constitutional amendment to act,” he argued, “the evil which had been
checked, will grow now.  We have no recourse but to amend the Constitution
for the sake of the children . . . .”324  Throughout the floor debates over such
proposals, senators and representatives repeatedly insisted that the Court
as desirable in the interest of the country’s welfare.”  Thomas I. Parkinson, Child Labor and
the Constitution, 12 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 110, 112–13 (1922).
319 TRATTNER, supra note 275, at 164.
320 Id.
321 III THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790–1966, at 2628, 2638
(Fred L. Israel ed., 1966); see 65 CONG. REC. 6353, 7285–86, 7291, 7293 (1924) (statements
of Mr. Foster) (discussing child labor); id. at 7261–62 (statements of Rep. Major of Mis-
souri) (proposing a child labor amendment); id. at 7277–79 (statements of Rep. Perlman)
(discussing the proposed child labor amendment); id. at 7298–7300 (statements of Rep.
Evans of Montana) (discussing child labor); 65 CONG. REC. 9583, 10115–17 (1924) (state-
ments of Sen. Fess) (highlighting child labor issues).
322 H.R. REP. NO. 1694 (67-4), at 2; see also 64 CONG. REC. 4445 (1923).  This assessment
was a verbatim reproduction of the views expressed in the Report of the Chief of the Chil-
dren’s Bureau. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
CHIEF, CHILDREN’S BUREAU TO THE SEC. OF LABOR FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30TH
(1922), at 11.
323 S. REP. NO. 1185 (67-4), 64 CONG. REC. 4459–67 (1923).
324 Id. at 5345.
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had left Congress no alternative but to amend the Constitution.325  No less
325 See 65 CONG. REC. 7176–77 (1924) (statements of Rep. Foster) (stating that after
Hammer and the Child Labor Tax Case, “[i]t therefore seems to be clearly established that
either Congress must abandon the object which was sought in these two laws or the Consti-
tution must be amended so as to give to Congress the power which it was believed to have
when these two acts were passed”); id. at 7269 (statements of Rep. Dickstein) (repeating
Rep. Foster’s statements almost verbatim); id. at 7275–76 (statements of Rep. Tillman)
(repeating Rep. Foster’s remarks almost verbatim); id. at 7251–52 (statements of Rep.
Hickey) (“Because of these decisions it is necessary either to amend the Constitution so
that Congress will have authority to legislate on this subject or leave the subject of child
labor to be dealt with solely by the States.”); id. at 7270–71 (statements of Rep. Kelly)
(arguing that Hammer and the Child Labor Tax Case left “only one course open . . . to
remove these limitations by submitting an amendment to the Constitution specifically
granting to Congress the power to limit, regulate, or prohibit child labor in the United
States”); id. at 7275 (statements of Rep. Moore) (“As a Federal Government we must either
abandon our efforts in this respect or amend the Constitution. . . . [T]he passage of this
resolution and its adoption by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States must be
accomplished before the Federal Government can provide any child-labor legislation, the
Supreme Court having twice declared that the Congress is without authority to enact child-
labor legislation.”); id. at 7296 (statements of Rep. Denison) (“The Supreme Court has
settled the question as to the power of Congress to enact such legislation under our pre-
sent constitutional limitations.”); id. at 7297 (statements of Rep. Cook) (“Congress is now
confronted with the alternative of either abandoning the question entirely or of proposing
this amendment.”); id. at 7316 (statements of Rep. Thatcher) (“Touching this great ques-
tion of child welfare, it is true that, as the matter now stands, the States have the sole
power—as held by the United States Supreme Court—to deal therewith.”); id. at 7306
(statements of Rep. Winter) (“It has become necessary, therefore, to attain this great and
vital end of limiting, regulating, and prohibiting child labor to give to the people of the
Union, speaking through their legislatures, the opportunity to ratify a constitutional
amendment.”); id. at 7307 (statements of Rep. Gallivan) (“The Supreme Court made itself
very clear as to the power of Congress to legislate against child labor . . . . Those who know
best have told us that the legislation under consideration is absolutely essential . . . . With
such a situation in this great land of ours there is but one thing for Congress to do and that
is to amend the Constitution.”); id. at 7315 (statements of Rep. Rogers) (“[A]ssuming that
Congress has done all it possibly could, but in vain, to work out the problem through
congressional legislation, the only thing left is a constitutional amendment.”); id. at 7168
(statements of Rep. O’Connor) (“[I]f we are to deal effectively with this vital problem from
a national standpoint, an amendment to our Constitution is necessary.”); id. at 7291–92
(statements of Rep. Tilson) (“It is said, with considerable force, that such an amendment
as this is the only adequate means of dealing with the subject.”); id. at 7172 (statements of
Rep. Larson) (“Deeming such legislation necessary, and having been twice advised by the
United States Supreme Court that such legislation—as the Constitution now stands—is not
within the power of Congress to enact, we propose that the Constitution be amended so
that Congress may have that power.”); id. at 7188–89 (statements of Rep. Jacobstein) (stat-
ing that after Hammer and the Child Labor Tax Case, “[t]he only means left was to amend
the Constitution, giving Congress the power to wipe out this industrial evil”); id. at 9993
(1924) (statements of Sen. Lenroot) (“There is only one other means that can accomplish
the object now since the decision of the Supreme Court has been rendered, and that is by
a constitutional amendment.”); id. at 10, 101–02 (statements of Sen. Shortridge) (“The
court seems to have made the issue clear—either to give up the plan of a Federal mini-
mum and rely solely upon the States, or to undertake to secure a Federal amendment
definitely giving to Congress the power to pass a child labor law.”).  This last quotation was
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an authority than North Carolina Democrat William Hammer, the former
U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina and the appellant in
Hammer v. Dagenhart,326 announced, “[b]y two decisions of the Supreme
Court it has been made clear that Congress does not now have the power to
act under the Constitution unless it is amended.”327
Members of Congress expressing these views could rely on the opinions
of distinguished legal scholars.  Ohio Republican Israel M. Foster quoted
from a letter written by Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound: “I do feel
impelled to express my conviction that now that it seems to be established by
decisions of the Supreme Court that Congress can not deal with this matter
under the Constitution as it stands, a constitutional amendment is impera-
tive.”328  Similarly, Michigan Republican Earl Michener quoted from a letter
from Dean Henry Bates of the University of Michigan Law School:
I venture to write to you in support of the proposed amendment relat-
ing to child labor . . . .
As you well know, all efforts to secure valid congressional legislation on
this subject without amendment to the Constitution have failed.  There is no
other recourse, if we are to meet this serious evil, than to amend the
Constitution.329
This opinion was perhaps expressed most colorfully by the redoubtable
Florence Kelley in her testimony before the House Judiciary Committee at
the second session of the 67th Congress.  Referring to Hammer and the Child
Labor Tax Case, Kelley testified that she was “convinced out of the twofold
experiences that we have had that we should be childish and fatuous to
attempt again by the method of Federal legislation . . . to give to our children
the privileges this country promised to all of them.”330  Instead, Kelley stated
that she looked “forward with ardent hope to a Federal amendment authoriz-
ing Congress to legislate.”331  Republican Ira Hersey of Maine, seeking to
clarify Kelley’s position, asked, “[w]ould you rather the committee should
pass another law of Congress without the constitutional amendment and put
taken directly from the Tenth Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, James J. Davis, the
relevant portion of which is reproduced at the 1923 Senate hearings, Child Labor Amend-
ment to the Constitution: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 200,
S.J. Res. 224, S.J. Res. 232, S.J. Res. 256, and S.J. Res. 262, 67th Cong. 20 (1923).  Davis wrote
to Shortridge on January 6, 1923, that “the decision of the court makes it clear that Con-
gress is without power at this time to legislate on the subject of children in industry, and
that an amendment to the Constitution is necessary in order to permit Congress to deal
with the subject.  The efforts of Congress heretofore have exhausted, it would seem, every
possible avenue under the Constitution, and all have been declared ineffective.”  The letter
is reproduced the hearings transcript. Id. at 17.
326 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
327 65 CONG. REC. 10,408 (1924).
328 Id. at 7181.
329 Id. at 7268.
330 1922 House Hearing, supra note 317, at 17 (statement of Florence Kelley, represent-
ing the Consumers’ League).
331 Id. at 18.
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it up to the Supreme Court, or would you rather we should pass or submit an
amendment to the Constitution?”332  To this the exasperated Kelley
responded:
No, sir: I would be glad to say that in recent years we have come to believe
that the moron is a person who is incapable of learning by experience.  We
have tried twice with the advice of the wisest lawyers whom we could sum-
mon to our aid . . . . to frame laws that the Supreme Court would uphold,
and having failed twice, I think we would enlist ourselves among the morons
if we spent another 40 years experimenting in the field of Federal
legislation.333
In short, contemporary observers deeply engaged with the issue of fed-
eral child labor reform did not believe that the Child Labor Tax could be
revised so as to pass constitutional muster by eliminating the scienter feature,
or by placing enforcement entirely in the Department of the Treasury, nor by
decreasing or more carefully tailoring the burden of the exaction.  They
believed any such efforts to frame and enact a revised taxing measure that
could run the judicial gauntlet would be futile.  Rather than eliminating the
distinguishing features of the Child Labor Tax identified by Chief Justice
Roberts, therefore, they instead turned their attention to an effort to amend
the Constitution to empower Congress to enact federal child labor
legislation.
C. The Question of Lawfulness
A crucial point of agreement between Chief Justice Roberts and the dis-
senting Justices can be found in the test they employed in discerning whether
the exaction imposed by the ACA was a tax or a penalty.  “In distinguishing
penalties from taxes,” the Chief Justice wrote, the “Court has explained
that”334 a penalty is “ ‘punishment for an unlawful act or omission,’”335 “‘an
exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.’”336  With
this the dissenting Justices concurred: “Our cases establish a clear line
between a tax and a penalty: ‘[A] tax is an enforced contribution to provide
for the support of government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by stat-
ute as punishment for an unlawful act.’”337  Thus, for both Chief Justice Rob-
332 Id.
333 Id.; see also CHAMBERS, supra note 275, at 33–34 (stating that in Kelley’s view, there
was “but one course of action open—amendment of the federal Constitution explicitly to
authorize Congress to enact national child-labor regulations.”).
334 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596 (2012).
335 Id. (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S.
213, 224 (1996)).
336 Id. (quoting United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).
337 Id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (alterations in original)
(quoting Reorganized CF&I, 518 U.S. at 224).
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erts and the dissenters, the issue was whether the ACA made the failure to
maintain minimum essential coverage unlawful.338
For the dissenting Supreme Court Justices, the question was, “quite sim-
ply, whether the exaction here is imposed for violation of the law.”339  To this
they answered, “It unquestionably is.”340  They noted that the statute “com-
mands that every ‘applicable individual shall . . . ensure that the individ-
ual . . . is covered under minimum essential coverage[,]’” and proceeded to
document a number of instances in which the statute speaks in terms of a
338 Two lower court judges had explicitly addressed this issue.  Though he did not
directly confront the Child Labor Tax Case in his dissenting opinion in Seven-Sky v. Holder,
Judge Kavanaugh maintained that the shared responsibility payment would be a constitu-
tional exercise of the taxing power under Sonzinsky and Sanchez so long as the individual
mandate were not interpreted to make the failure to purchase insurance unlawful.  661
F.3d 1, 47–50 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction and not decid-
ing the merits), abrogated by Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  But Judge Kavanaugh did
believe that the minimum coverage provision might plausibly be read to make failure to
acquire insurance illegal.  That provision, Judge Kavanaugh pointed out, “arguably does
not just incentivize certain kinds of lawful behavior but also mandates such behavior. . . .
Therefore, beginning in 2014, a citizen who does not maintain health insurance might be
acting illegally.” Id. at 48.  This uncertainty on the issue of whether the ACA made failure
to acquire insurance unlawful had led Judge Kavanaugh to question whether the shared
responsibility payment could be “squeeze[d] . . . within the Taxing Clause.” Id. at 48 n.38.
Judge Sutton did not explicitly conclude that the ACA made failure to purchase insurance
unlawful, though he did quote it as imposing a “requirement” to do so.  Thomas More Law
Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 551–52 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part).  A
“‘tax,’” Judge Sutton explained, “‘is an enforced contribution to provide for the support
of government.’” Id. at 550 (quoting La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572).  Its “central objective” is
to “‘obtain[ ] revenue.’” Id. at 550 (alteration in original) (quoting Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)).  By contrast, a “‘penalty’ . . . regulates conduct by establishing
‘criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its principal consequence on those who transgress its
standard.’” Id. (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38).  The latter, Judge Sutton
concluded, was precisely what the minimum coverage provision did.  It operated by “start-
ing with a substantive provision that ‘adopt[s] the criteria of wrongdoing,’” id. at 552
(alteration in original) (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 20), “which states that
every ‘applicable individual shall’ have health insurance.” Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(a) (Supp. V 2011)).  It then “spell[ed] out the ‘principal consequence on those
who transgress its standard’ . . . which is to impose a penalty” on those who failed to meet
that requirement. Id. at 552 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38).  This gave the
minimum coverage provision “the ‘characteristics of regulation and punishment’ . . . not
taxation.” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)).
Judge Sutton nevertheless thought it
easy to envision a system of national health care, including one with a minimum-
essential-coverage provision, permissibly premised on the taxing power.  Congress
might have raised taxes on everyone in an amount equivalent to the current pen-
alty, then offered credits to those with minimum essential insurance.  Or it might
have imposed a lower tax rate on people with health insurance than those without
it.  But Congress did neither of these things, and that makes a difference.
Id. at 550.
339 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2652 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
340 Id.
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“requirement” to maintain minimum essential coverage.341  This conclusion
was reinforced by the fact that “[e]ighteen times” the statute refers to the
shared responsibility payment as a “ ‘penalty.’”342  The Court, the dissenters
pointed out, had “never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the
law is an exercise of Congress’ taxing power—even when the statute calls it a
tax, much less when (as here) the statute repeatedly calls it a penalty.”343
The dissenters reiterated, “We never have classified as a tax an exaction
imposed for violation of the law, and so too, we never have classified as a tax
an exaction described in the legislation itself as a penalty.”344
The dissenting Justices dismissed the Government’s contention that the
statute imposed no legal duty to acquire health insurance.  “In the face of all
these indications of a regulatory requirement accompanied by a penalty,” the
dissenters noted,
the Solicitor General assures us that ‘neither the Treasury Department nor
the Department of Health and Human Services interprets Section 5000A as
imposing a legal obligation,’ and that ‘[i]f [those subject to the Act] pay the
tax penalty, they’re in compliance with the law’ . . . . [t]hese self-serving
litigating positions,
the Justices asserted, “are entitled to no weight.  What counts is what the
statute says, and that is entirely clear.”345  The Court could not “rewrite the
statute to be what it is not.”346  The ACA offered a “mountain of evidence
that the minimum coverage requirement is what the statute calls it—a
requirement—and that the penalty for its violation is what the statute calls
it—a penalty.”347  There was “simply no way, ‘without doing violence to the
fair meaning of the words used,’ . . . to escape what Congress enacted: a
mandate that individuals maintain minimum essential coverage, enforced by
a penalty.”348  The terms of the statute “rende[red] it ‘unavoidable’ . . . that
Congress imposed a regulatory penalty, not a tax.  For all these reasons, to say
that the Individual Mandate merely imposes a tax [was] not to interpret the
statute but to rewrite it.”349
On this question of whether the statute imposed a legal duty to maintain
minimum essential coverage, Chief Justice Roberts disagreed.  “While the
individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health insurance,”
he wrote,
341 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2011)).
342 Id. at 2653 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)).
343 Id. at 2651.
344 Id. at 2653.  The dissenters asserted that in some cases “this Court has held that a
‘tax’ imposed upon private conduct was so onerous as to be in effect a penalty.  But we
have never held—never—that a penalty imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to
be in effect a tax.” Id. at 2651.
345 Id. at 2653 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
346 Id. at 2651.
347 Id. at 2654.
348 Id. at 2651 (citation omitted).
349 Id. at 2655 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448 (1830)).
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it need not be read to declare that failing to do so is unlawful.  Neither the
Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying
health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS.  The Government
agrees with that reading, confirming that if someone chooses to pay rather
than obtain health insurance, they have fully complied with the law.350
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts concluded, “the shared responsibility payment
merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying
health insurance.”351
This interpretive dispute was in my view an unnecessary detour for two
reasons.  First, earlier in its opinion, the Court had held that the individual
mandate could be sustained neither as an exercise of Congress’s commerce
power,352 nor as an exercise of its power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.353  Because Congress had no enumerated power to make the failure
to purchase minimum essential coverage illegal, the failure to purchase such
coverage could not be illegal.  The shared responsibility payment therefore
could not be a “‘punishment for an unlawful act,’”354 because the failure to
purchase minimum essential coverage is not and could not be made an
unlawful act.
Second, this interpretive dispute was misguided because it proceeded
from a definition of a penalty taken from a 1931 case seeking to determine
whether an exaction imposed additional punishment for a crime in violation
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.355  That proceeding involved a civil action to
collect a tax for sales of liquor that were made illegal by the National Prohibi-
tion Act, and for which the respondent already had been convicted and pun-
ished in a separate criminal prosecution.356  There was no doubt there that
Congress had power under the Eighteenth Amendment to make the sales
involved unlawful.  But the definition of a penalty adopted in that case was
never controlling in the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny, which held that
putative taxes were penalties even though the conduct triggering the tax was
350 Id. at 2596–97 (majority opinion).
351 Id. at 2597.  Chief Justice Roberts stated,
Under the mandate, if an individual does not maintain health insurance, the only
consequence is that he must make an additional payment to the IRS when he pays
his taxes. . . . That, according to the Government, means the mandate can be
regarded as establishing a condition—not owning health insurance—that triggers
a tax—the required payment to the IRS.  Under that theory, the mandate is not a
legal command to buy insurance.  Rather, it makes going without insurance just
another thing the Government taxes . . . .
Id. at 2593–94 (citation omitted).  He stated further that “imposition of a tax . . . leaves an
individual with a lawful choice to do or not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a
tax levied on that choice.” Id. at 2600.
352 Id. at 2591.
353 Id. at 2593.
354 Id. at 2596 (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)).
355 United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).
356 Id. at 572–73.
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not unlawful.  Indeed, those putative taxes had been imposed on the conduct
in question precisely because Congress had no power to make such conduct
unlawful.
Thus, even if Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of the statute is the
correct one, this feature of the ACA does not distinguish it from the Child
Labor Tax.  Indeed, in his brief before the Court in the Child Labor Tax Case,
Solicitor General James Beck contended, unsuccessfully, that an exaction was
a penalty “where the statute prohibits the doing of an act and as a sanction
imposes a pecuniary punishment for violating the act,” but was a tax where
the exaction merely imposed an excise on the privilege of performing a legal
act.357  Beck pointed out that the Child Labor Tax did not “pretend
to . . . prohibit the employment of child labor.  If a manufacturer desires to
employ such labor, he is free to do so; but, if he does so, he must pay an
excise tax for the privilege.”358  The Child Labor Tax left the manufacturer
free to exercise “his undoubted right to employ child labor.”359  The statute,
Beck maintained, “does not prohibit child labor.  It merely requires the man-
ufacturer who employs child labor to pay a tax not imposed upon one who
does not employ child labor.”360  Yet this argument was unavailing.
Indeed, in his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taft recognized that
the Child Labor Tax did not “expressly declare that the employment within
the mentioned ages is illegal.”361  As the dissenting Justices in Sebelius sug-
gested, the ACA might at least plausibly be interpreted as intended to impose
a legal duty to acquire and maintain minimum essential coverage.362  By con-
trast, as Chief Justice Taft recognized, there was no plausible argument in the
Child Labor Tax Case that entities employing child labor were thereby violat-
ing federal law.363  Nevertheless, the Court there concluded that the putative
tax was in fact a regulatory penalty.364  Neither did the Futures Trading Act
make it unlawful to enter into contracts for future delivery other than on
boards of trade designated as contract markets by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture.365  Nevertheless, in Hill v. Wallace the Court held the tax imposed by
that Act to be a regulatory penalty.366  Nor did the Bituminous Coal Conser-
357 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 21–22 (1922).
358 Id. at 22.
359 Id. at 25.
360 Id. at 22.
361 Id. at 38. Taft did assert that the statute exhibited “its intent practically to achieve
the latter result by adopting the criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its principal conse-
quence on those who transgress its standard.” Id.  But as Judge Sutton argued, the ACA
did precisely the same thing, by imposing the shared responsibility payment on those who
failed to meet the statute’s requirement to acquire health insurance.  Thomas More Law
Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 552 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part).
362 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644, 2651 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
363 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38.
364 Id. at 37.
365 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 45, 63–64 (1922).
366 Id. at 66.
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vation Act of 1935 make it illegal to mine or sell coal on terms other than
those prescribed by the Bituminous Coal Code.367  Yet in Carter Coal the
Court held that the tax imposed by that statute was a regulatory penalty.368
None of these statutes made failure to abide by their regulatory schemes
unlawful.  They merely made a payment to the government the price of refus-
ing to submit.  Nevertheless, the Court in each instance held that those exac-
tions were regulatory penalties rather than true taxes.  The Child Labor Tax
Case and its progeny make it clear that it is not necessary for an exaction to
be deemed a penalty that the conduct taxed be unlawful.  Unlawfulness may
be sufficient to support the conclusion that an exaction is a regulatory pen-
alty, but it is not a necessary condition.369
To sum up, then, the Child Labor Tax did not make the employment of
child labor unlawful; it did raise revenue; it did not in fact prevent the
employment of child labor; and its proponents did not think that it could be
salvaged by lowering the rate, by a more narrow tailoring of the tax, by excis-
ing the scienter requirement, or by moving enforcement entirely into the
Department of the Treasury.  What was it, then, that made the Child Labor
Tax an unconstitutional penalty, and why did contemporary child labor
reformers regard the prospect of a revised Child Labor Tax that would pass
constitutional muster as a delusion?
367 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278–79 (1936).
368 Id. at 310, 316.
369 Indeed, even Chief Justice Taft’s references to “wrongdoing” and “transgress[ion]”
must be handled with care.  Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38.  Like Judge Sutton in
Thomas More Law Center, the dissenting Justices maintained that “[w]hen an act ‘adopt[s]
the criteria of wrongdoing’ and then imposes a monetary penalty as the ‘principal conse-
quence on those who transgress its standard,’ it creates a regulatory penalty, not a tax.”
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651–52 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38).  But as we
have just seen, under the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny, it is clear that such “wrong-
doing” need not be illegal for the exaction to be a penalty.  And if instead all that is meant
by “wrongdoing” is conduct sufficiently threatening to public health, safety, morals, or wel-
fare that its prohibition would not violate the Constitution, then the criterion will not
suffice to explain the pattern of the Court’s taxing power decisions.  For the “wrongful”
acts of manufacturing oleomargarine, of engaging in the business of gambling, and of
selling opium, marijuana, or sawed-off shotguns all could be criminalized without depriv-
ing those engaged in the conduct of any constitutionally protected rights.  See, e.g., United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 176–77, 183 (1939) (certain firearms); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321, 363–64 (1903) (lotteries); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686–87
(1888) (oleomargarine); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1880) (lotteries).  And yet
the Court had upheld the taxation of each of these forms of “wrongdoing,” while the Jus-
tices had invalidated taxation of firms employing child labor even though the employment
of such labor was also sufficiently “wrongful” to be subject to prohibition by the state’s
police power. See Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 321, 324–26
(1913) (holding constitutional the Child Labor Act of Illinois of 1903).  Clearly, whether
an exaction was triggered by some form of legal or moral “wrongdoing” was not sufficient
to distinguish a valid tax from a regulatory penalty.
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V. THE ANALYSIS OF THOMAS REED POWELL
For illumination of this question, let us turn to the reaction of one of the
period’s most astute contemporary commentators on constitutional law.  Per-
haps predictably, the Child Labor Tax Case had both detractors370 and defend-
ers.371  Interestingly, the latter group included prominent critics of Hammer,
who continued to maintain that the first Child Labor Case had been decided
incorrectly, but that the Child Labor Tax Case had reached the correct
result.372  Among this group was Thomas Reed Powell, then a professor at
Columbia University Law School.  In 1922 Professor Powell published two
articles analyzing the Child Labor Tax Case.  One was a review of the Supreme
Court’s constitutional decisions during the preceding term, published in the
Michigan Law Review;373 the second was devoted entirely to the child labor
decisions, and was published in the inaugural issue of the North Carolina Law
Review.374  Powell began the section of the Michigan article discussing the
Child Labor Tax with a riddle: “ ‘When is a tax not a tax?’” In the Child Labor
Tax Case, he reported, the Court had given the following answer to that
“conundrum”: “When from the face of the statute it appears that a prohibi-
tory or regulatory penalty has been imposed for a departure from a detailed
and specified course of conduct in business.”375  Notice that Powell
described the penalty disjunctively, as “prohibitory or regulatory.”  Chief Jus-
tice Taft had said of the Child Labor Tax that “its prohibitory and regulatory
370 See Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1921–1922: The Constitutional Decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1921, 16 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 612,
612–16 (1922) (discussing the Child Labor Tax Case); Parkinson, supra note 318, at 110–13
(addressing the outcome in the Child Labor Tax Case).
371 See Walter F. Dodd, The Growth of National Power, 32 YALE L.J. 452, 453–54 (1923)
(discussing the decision and federal power); Long, supra note 317, at 81 (addressing the
taxing power in relation to the Child Labor Tax Case); The Supreme Court Rescues the Constitu-
tion, 6 CONST. REV. 180 (1922) (supporting the decision); J.E. Peyser, Case Comment, Con-
stitutional Law: Child Labor Law: Taxing Power as a Means of Regulation, 10 CAL. L. REV. 501,
503–04 (1922) (“[T]he rules and their applications were correctly employed, for the his-
tory of the legislation, as well as the face of the statute itself, reveals its purpose.  The fact
that it was not intended as a revenue measure, but merely to effect a penalty for disregard
of a Congressional regulation, is so evident that ‘a court must be blind not to see it.’”
(citation omitted)).
372 See Frankfurter, supra note 318, at 248 (addressing the issue of child labor and the
Court’s recent decisions); Powell, supra note 269, at 72 (discussing the Child Labor Tax Case
decision); William A. Sutherland, The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution, 8 CORNELL L.Q.
338, 338 (1922) (“It is the opinion of the writer that Justices McKenna, Holmes, and Bran-
deis were right in both cases; that the first act should have been held constitutional, while
the second act was properly held unconstitutional. . . . The case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co. . . . was correctly decided and marks a return by the court to sound principles in
dealing with the taxing clause of the Constitution.”).
373 Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court’s Adjudication of Constitutional Issues in
1921–1922, III, 21 MICH. L. REV. 290, 290 (1922) (discussing the issue of taxation in the
Child Labor Tax Case).
374 Powell, supra note 269.
375 Powell, supra note 373, at 290.
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effect and purpose are palpable,” and it appeared to Powell that “one of the
necessary links in the chain leading to the decision was that the burden of
the exaction was so onerous” that this regulatory character was clear.376  But
Powell recognized that the Child Labor Tax “was not completely prohibitive,”
as “[s]ome concerns might prefer to pay an added ten per cent of their prof-
its rather than to deny to children the opportunity to aid in supporting them-
selves and their family.”377  Moreover, he pointed out, “[o]ne of the cases
which came before the court was a suit to recover a tax that had been
paid.”378  Thus, “[o]ne point that appears plainly from the Child Labor Tax
Case is that a federal statute which in form imposes an excise may be a regula-
tion rather than a tax even though it yields some revenue.”379  Therefore, he
concluded, “the decision could not rest on a principle that taxation must be
for revenue.”380  “It rests rather on the detailed specification of the condi-
tions subjecting employers to a tax sufficiently onerous to induce them gen-
erally to alter the conduct of their business so as to eliminate the elements
giving rise to the demand.”381
376 Powell, supra note 269, at 80 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
377 Id. at 71.
378 Id.
379 Id. at 80.  “The child labor statute could not be declared unconstitutional on the
ground that it was not a revenue producing measure, for the case before the court was a
suit to recover back a tax that had been paid.” Id.  Powell did recognize that the Child
Labor Tax was not actually intended to raise revenue: “Its proponents were the extermina-
tors of child labor and not the financiers of the government.  Those who lament its failure
to pass muster with the court are led by Mr. Lovejoy, not by Mr. Mellon.” Id. at 70–71.  In
advocating for the Child Labor Tax in Congress, Senator Pomerene had argued, “[W]e saw
fit to draft this provision for the purpose of raising revenue and at the same time to meet
the child-labor problem.”  57 CONG. REC. 613 (1918).  Other senators, however, insisted
that the provision was not truly for the purpose of raising revenue.  Senator Lodge, one of
the principal proponents of the exaction, admitted that “[t]he amount of revenue to be
raised by this measure may be little or nothing.  The main purpose is to put a stop to what
seems to be a very great evil.” Id. at 611; see also id. at 609 (statement by Sen. Hardwick)
(explaining that the tax “is not levied in this case[ ] for the real purpose of raising
revenue”).
380 Powell, supra note 373, at 291.  Powell did believe, however, that an exaction whose
“success as an income producer to the government is considerable and notorious” could in
the future be sustained as a tax rather than a penalty with “little difficulty.”  Powell, supra
note 269, at 80.
381 Powell, supra note 373, at 291–92; see also Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to
Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90 (2012) (noting that “[e]ven in its most constrained
approach to the tax power in the 1920s and 1930s,” the Court “consistently refused to
invalidate tax measures simply because they were motivated by a regulatory purpose” and
that “[i]nstead, decisions like The Child Labor Tax Case . . . underscored that the high levels
of the putative taxes at issue meant they were really penalties in disguise, aimed at compel-
ling adherence to detailed regulatory schemes that Congress lacked authority to impose”);
cf. Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Minimum
Coverage Provision), supra note 240, at 10 (“[D]uring the 1920s and 1930s the Court did
invalidate some federal taxes on the ground that they had been adopted primarily to
enforce compliance with a regulatory program that exceeded Congress’s authority under
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Thus, Powell identified two essential distinguishing features of a penalty:
a departure from a detailed and specified course of conduct, and an exaction
sufficiently onerous to induce the alteration of behavior.382  At the same
time, Powell seemed to recognize that the second of these criteria was less
central.  After all, as some pointed out, the oleomargarine tax imposed a levy
on colored oleomargarine forty times the tax on uncolored oleomargarine,
and that exaction was nevertheless a tax rather than a penalty.383  A “heavy
exaction” alone clearly was not sufficient to make an ostensible tax a pen-
alty.384  And “if the present [child labor] tax had been sustained,” Powell
the then-prevailing interpretation of the Commerce Clause. . . . Even if the Court’s Lochner-
era decisions retained some force today, they would merely support invalidating as pretex-
tual a tax so high as to amount to a coercive penalty to compel compliance with a regula-
tory scheme that falls wholly outside Congress’s other enumerated powers.  That was the
situation addressed by those decisions, and that is how the Court has interpreted them
since then.”).  Powell suggested that the detailing and specification of a course of conduct
would be fatal only where the regulatory features of the statute were “unrelated to any
fiscal object.”  Powell, supra note 260, at 78–79.  By this he meant that the regulatory fea-
tures of the statute were not related to the collection of an otherwise valid exaction, as the
Court had held that they were in Doremus. Id. at 79–80.  Powell read Taft to say that regula-
tions annexed to a tax law must themselves bear a close “relation to the primary fiscal
purpose of getting a revenue,” and concluded that “the child labor tax law on its face
imposes such detailed tests of taxability unrelated to any fiscal object that its predominant
characteristic is that of a regulatory measure.” Id. at 77.  Powell surely recognized that the
proponents of the Child Labor Tax had offered what they regarded as “fiscal reasons” for
taxing firms employing child labor.  As Solicitor General Beck argued in the Child Labor
Tax Case, “I do not concede that no fiscal reason can be assigned, which justifies the Child
Labor Law as a revenue measure.  It is notorious that child labor is cheap labor, and this
being so, Congress may have considered this privilege of cheaper production as a fiscal
reason for the tax.”  Brief on Behalf of Appellants and Plaintiff in Error at 21, Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (No. 657); see also Corwin, supra note 370, at 613–14 (“Con-
cerns which employ child labor occupy a degraded plane of competition and presumably
enjoy special profits in consequence; why then, should not these profits be subject to spe-
cial exactions by the taxing-power, whether national or local?”).
382 Cf. Samuel A. Goldberg, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Federal Tax on Employers of
Child Labor, 71 U. PA. L. REV. 54, 57 (1922) (“The Child Labor Act, if it differs at all from
the previous acts which had been upheld, does so by combining in itself all the elements
which aroused objection in the other acts severally—excessive amount of tax, taxing a pro-
cess of business, accompanying provisions for detailed specifications and inspections.  To
these are added the elements of knowledge of the taxpayer and the fact that the tax must
be paid whether one or many children are employed.  Granting that all these elements
strongly indicate the prohibitive feature of the act, based solely on precedent the act could
have been held constitutional.”(citations omitted)).
383 Note, State Rights and the Child Labor Tax Law, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 659, 660–61 (1922)
(“As to the ‘heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of the [sic] regulation,’ it is perhaps
enough to say that oleomargarine not manufactured in the way and under the conditions
desired, was taxed forty times as highly as other oleomargarine.” (quoting Child Labor Tax
Case, 259 U.S. 20, 42 (1922))).
384 See Long, supra note 317, at 82 (“It is no objection to the constitutionality of a tax
that it is fixed so high as to suppress the thing taxed.”).
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conjectured, “it would be almost impossible to balk” at a tax imposing a
higher rate.385  Thus, Powell remarked,
[t]he burden of the tax will always be an element to consider, but it seldom
can be exclusively controlling.  A very slight burden may be enough to
induce abandonment of the taxable enterprise or the taxable mode of con-
ducting it.  A heavy burden may be borne for a number of years before read-
justment is feasible.386
“Perhaps,” he concluded, “after all, the most workable test will be the charac-
ter and extent of the particulars which are the basis of taxability,” and
whether those particulars bore a “reasonable relation to any fiscal
purpose.”387
It was this idea, Powell maintained, that lay at the core of the Chief Jus-
tice’s opinion.  Taft had distinguished the tax upheld on state bank notes in
Veazie Bank v. Fenno by observing that “ ‘the sole objection’” to that tax “‘was
its excessive character. . . . There were no elaborate specifications on the face
of the act, as here, indicating the purpose to regulate matters of state con-
cern through an exaction so applied as to give it the qualities of a penalty for
violation of law rather than a tax.’”388  Similarly, Taft had argued, the oleo-
margarine law upheld in McCray did not “‘show on its face,’” as did the Child
Labor Tax, “ ‘the detailed specifications of a regulation of a state concern and
business with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such regula-
tion.’”389  In both of those cases, the exaction had been heavy, but it had not
been coupled with “‘elaborate’”390 or “‘detailed specifications of a regula-
tion of a state concern.’”391  These distinctions made it clear to Powell that
the criteria of taxability “must be rather narrowly confined to the identifica-
tion of the selected commodity by some of its inherent and continuing char-
acteristics, and may not include detailed specifications of the conditions
under which the commodity is made.”392 Hill v. Wallace, which the same day
had invalidated a tax imposed in the absence of “fulfilment [sic] of detailed
requirements set forth in the statute and in administrative regulations,” made
this requirement “certain.”393  Thus, Powell concluded, “Chief Justice Taft
says that a statute which on its face imposes detailed police regulations of a
sufficiently extensive character is not an exercise of the federal taxing
power.”394
It was this understanding that continued to inform the Court’s later
decisions on the scope of the taxing power.  In Sonzinsky, where the exaction
385 Powell, supra note 269, at 71.
386 Id. at 80.
387 Id. at 80–81.
388 Id. at 75 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 41).
389 Id. at 72 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 42).
390 Id. at 75 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 41).
391 Id. at 72 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 42).
392 Id.
393 Id. (citing Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922)).
394 Id. at 76.
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was so significant that fewer than thirty people nationwide paid it,395 the Gov-
ernment argued that decisions such as the Child Labor Tax Case and Hill v.
Wallace were “distinguishable [because] [t]hey involve[d] penalties for fail-
ure to comply with federal regulations deemed to be beyond the power of
Congress.”396  Justice Stone’s opinion for the Sonzinsky Court observed that
“[t]he case is not one where the statute contains regulatory provisions related
to a purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in other
cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing the regu-
lations.”397  Justice Stone thus concluded, “[a]s it is not attended by an offen-
sive regulation, and since it operates as a tax, it is within the national taxing
power.”398  Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Kahriger, Justice Frank-
furter understood the Child Labor Tax Case to stand for the proposition that
“[a] nominal taxing measure must be found an inadmissible intrusion into a
domain of legislation reserved for the States . . . when Congress requires that
such a measure is to be enforced through a detailed scheme of administra-
tion beyond the obvious fiscal needs.”399
In other words, as Professors Bickel and Wood recognized, subsequent
decisions did not impair or modify the conception of the tax/penalty distinc-
tion that undergirded the Child Labor Tax Case opinion.  To be sure, the
expansion of the commerce power narrowed the range of instances in which
that distinction would be relevant: if an ostensible excise was imposed in
order to encourage compliance with a regulation that Congress was empow-
ered to enact under the Commerce Clause, it would not matter whether the
imposition was categorized as a tax or as a penalty.  But the distinction itself,
though dormant, remained unaltered.  The doctrine that a penalty unsup-
ported by another enumerated power was unconstitutional therefore per-
sisted, and would again become relevant were Congress to enact legislation
that could not be sustained as an exercise of another of its enumerated pow-
ers.  And that, of course, is precisely what Chief Justice Roberts and the joint
dissenters had held with respect to the shared responsibility payment in the
portion of their opinion dealing with the commerce power.
Powell agreed that the features of the tax to which Taft called attention
“amply supported” the view that “the child labor tax law on its face imposes
such detailed tests of taxability unrelated to any fiscal object that its predomi-
nant characteristic is that of a regulatory measure.”400  And he recognized
that some of the “features which stamp the child labor act as a regulatory
measure”—the scienter requirement, the provision for factory inspection by
“the Secretary of Labor and his subordinates,” and the failure to proportion
395 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 n.1 (1937).
396 Id. at 510–11.
397 Id. at 513.
398 Id. at 514.
399 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 39 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), over-
ruled in part by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
400 Powell, supra note 269, at 77.  “[N]o honest judgment can find fault with the dis-
cernment of the court in the present case.” Id. at 78.
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the tax to the extent of the employment of child labor—“of course might be
eliminated from other efforts to accomplish the same result.”401  But the
other provisions, imposing age restrictions and limitations on hours of work,
were “practically essential to any scheme of regulation.”402  It is little wonder,
then, that proponents of federal child labor reform held out scant hope that
a revised taxing measure could survive judicial review.
Powell credited Taft with fully recognizing “that the distinction between
a tax and a police regulation is not sharp and clear, and that a statute may
have the characteristics of both so that the problem is to determine which
predominate.”403  The problem was “one of degree” and the solution was “far
from an easy one.”404  As Taft put it, the “‘difference’” was “‘sometimes diffi-
cult to define.’”405  An “‘incidental motive’” to discourage certain conduct
by making its “ ‘continuance onerous’” did not cause an exaction with “‘the
primary motive of obtaining revenue’” to lose its “ ‘character’” as a tax.406
“‘But there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the
so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty,
with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.”407  As Powell summa-
rized the matter,
This does not say that police regulations annexed to a tax law necessarily
deprive it of the character of an exercise of fiscal power.  It puts for a test the
extent and character of such police regulations and the closeness of their
relation to the primary fiscal purpose of getting a revenue.408
Notwithstanding the difficulty of the inquiry, Powell thought that it was
necessary if the federal system was to be preserved.  Powell agreed that “a
401 Id. at 77.
402 Id. at 77–78 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922)).  “Plainly, there-
fore, Congress could not remove the taint from the child labor tax by changing it from a
tax on income to a specific exaction on the manufacture or sale of goods produced by
child labor, or in mines or factories in which children work.” Id. at 72.
403 Id. at 76.
404 Id. at 77.
405 Id. (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38).
406 Id. (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38).  Powell made clear his under-
standing that Taft was using the term “purpose” to refer not to “something inside the
heads of congressmen and senators,” but to “something apparent from what they have put
on the statute book.” Id. at 76.  Powell insisted that Taft gave “full recognition” to the
“canon against judicial assumption of congressional motives,” id. at 75, excluding “judicial
inquiry into any realm to which he is not led by the language of the law.” Id. at 76.  Taft’s
position was that it was proper for the Court to consider “‘purpose’ to the extent that it
appears on the face of the law”—to consider purpose “as something apparent from what
. . . [congressmen and senators] have put on the statute book.” Id.  “The court does not
care about the end aimed at except so far as it is accomplished.  The functional use of the
word ‘purpose’ . . . is the same as though the Chief Justice had said ‘necessary effects or
results.’” Id.  There was a “difference between sticking to the statute and going outside it,”
id. at 75, and Taft did not engage in “judicial speculation on matters extrinsic to what
Congress has actually said and done.” Id. at 76.
407 Id. at 77 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38).
408 Id.
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federal excise, in form a tax, may be in substance a police regulation so obvi-
ously unrelated to any fiscal enterprise as to be outside the taxing power
vested in Congress.  No one with sense can deny the substantial wisdom of
this.”409  On the need to draw “some line . . . between form and substance” in
the exercise of the taxing power, Powell argued,
[T]here can be no debate unless one is to conceive of the federal system
ordained by the Constitution as one giving Congress full power of police
throughout the country, provided only this power is exercised under some
other name than that of police.  Such a conception may find support in fine-
spun formalistic reasoning, but it so violates history and common sense that
it may be dismissed without more ado.410
Powell fully agreed with Taft that a decision upholding the tax would
have led down a slippery slope to plenary congressional authority.  Powell
observed,
Such a tax . . . if successful, would be a precedent for the constitutionality of
similar depressive exactions on enterprises paying less than a prescribed
minimum wage, working labor more than a prescribed number of hours per
day or per week, failing to comply with standards of safety or with any other
police tests laid down by Congress as a discrimen between taxability and
non-taxability.411
The Court’s decision, Powell concluded, “was essential to safeguarding the
federal system from being warped beyond recognition.”412
Powell thus read the Child Labor Tax Case as establishing the proposition
that the values of federalism could be preserved in taxing power jurispru-
dence only through the application of a standard rather than through
enforcement of a rule. Sebelius provides an opportunity to reflect on that
view.  The dissenting Justices maintained that the shared responsibility pay-
ment was a penalty rather than a tax because it imposed an exaction as pun-
ishment for an unlawful act.  Accepting this definition of the distinction
between a tax and a penalty made the issue turn on whether the ACA in fact
made the failure to maintain minimum health coverage illegal.  Because the
dissenters believed that the ACA clearly did so, their formulation of the tax-
penalty distinction would have been sufficient to preserve their federalism
values had Chief Justice Roberts agreed with their interpretation of the
statute.
But note that this is so only because of the way in which the statute was
drafted.  Suppose that Congress had denominated the “penalty” as a “tax”
throughout the statute, and had made it clear that failure to purchase insur-
409 Id. at 72–73.
410 Id. at 73. “Those who would contend that the child labor tax was constitutional must
either rely on arguments that offend common sense or else insist that the court can never
go behind form to substance . . . .” Id. at 71.
411 Id. at 69.  After the Court’s decision, however, “protective labor legislation cannot
be introduced into an excise law without getting discovered.” Id. at 79.
412 Id. at 81.  Therefore, “[n]o valid criticism against it can be premised on the difficul-
ties it engenders in passing on more difficult issues in the future.” Id.
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ance was not itself illegal.  The regulatory effect of the provision would have
been identical, but because of its formulation as a tax on conduct in which
individuals were legally free to engage or not to engage, the imposition
would have been clearly constitutional under the rule-like test embraced by
the dissenters.  As the dissenting Justices conceded, “[t]he issue is not
whether Congress had the power to frame the minimum coverage provision as
a tax, but whether it did so.”413  But such unfavorable facts could easily be
avoided through careful drafting, and the sort of standard championed by
Taft and Powell is far better suited to preventing Congress from exercising
extensive regulatory authority through its taxing power.414  Such a standard
of course has the usual disadvantages of standards—greater uncertainty of
application and less constrained judicial discretion than one associates with
rules415—and judges who generally favor rules over standards for these rea-
sons416 may be disinclined to adopt and reinvigorate it.  But as Powell argued
long ago, that may be the cost of preserving the values of federalism.
VI. APPLICATION TO THE ACA
A. The Burden of the Exaction
Chief Justice Roberts did not regard the ACA’s shared responsibility pay-
ment as imposing a heavy burden on the taxpayer.  He observed that “for
most Americans the amount due will be far less than the price of insurance,
and, by statute, it can never be more.”417
In 2016, for example, individuals making $35,000 [per] year [were]
expected to owe the IRS about $60 for any month in which they [did] not
413 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651 (2012) (Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
414 Powell was concerned that even this standard might be too easily evaded.  He
thought it might ultimately be necessary to overrule McCray, because
[o]f the statute there involved it could be said with a large degree of truth, as
Chief Justice Taft said of the child labor statute, that “it provides a heavy exaction
for a departure from a detailed and specified course of conduct in business.”  The
details of the specification were less numerous than those of the child labor law,
since they were confined to the kind of product and its complexion.  Yet we may
be confident that a new child labor tax would fail although it adopted the simple
test of articles made or mined where children under sixteen were employed.  If
Congress seeks to defy the principle underlying the Child Labor Case, the court
can keep the principle effective only by ceasing to distinguish between many
details and few.  It may be said of every tax that it provides an exaction for a
departure from a specified course of business.
Powell, supra note 269, at 78.  Under McCray, Powell believed, the only “shield against
arbitrary exactions or unreasonable discrimination”—such as might be imposed by “a spe-
cial excise on divorcees or law teachers”—was the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 79.
415 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1688–89 (1976).
416 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1181–82 (1989).
417 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96.
2013] N F I B V . S E B E L I U S –  transformation  of  taxing  power 189
have health insurance . . . [, while those] with an annual income of
$100,000 . . . [were] likely [to] owe [around] $200 [for any such month].
The price of a qualifying [individual] insurance policy[, by contrast, was]
projected to be around $400 per month.418
Indeed, it was estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that 3.9
million people419 each year would “choose to pay the IRS rather than buy
insurance.”420  Thus, the Chief Justice concluded, “[i]t may often be a rea-
sonable financial decision to make the payment rather than purchase insur-
ance, unlike the ‘prohibitory’ financial punishment” imposed by the Child
Labor Tax.421
For the reasons noted above, the Chief Justice may have overestimated
the “prohibitory” character of the Child Labor Tax.  But he may also have
underestimated the extent to which the shared responsibility payment could
be expected to induce taxpayers to purchase qualifying insurance.  This is
easiest to see for those who would pay the maximum assessment, which is
equivalent to the national average premium amount for qualifying insur-
ance—hypothesized by the Internal Revenue Service for purposes of illustra-
tion to be $20,000 for a family policy in 2016.422  In the case of employing
child labor or manufacturing colored oleomargarine, for example, a law-
abiding rational taxpayer weighs the benefits of engaging in the enterprise
against the tax costs of doing so.  The fact that these taxes yielded revenue—
in some cases significant revenue423—suggests that in these instances some
individuals found it to be a reasonable financial decision to pay the tax rather
than to desist from the taxed conduct.  In the case of the individual paying
the maximum assessment, however, it is difficult to see how it would be
rational to pay the tax.  A law-abiding taxpayer could pay $20,000 to an insur-
ance company and in exchange receive minimum essential coverage, or he
could make the payment to the government and receive nothing in return.
Unless the transaction costs involved in securing a qualifying policy approach
418 Id. at 2596 n.8.
419 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 3 (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/individual_mandate_penalties-
04-30.pdf.
420 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2597.
421 Id. at 2596 (citation omitted).
422 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) (Supp. V 2011); Dep’t of Treasury, Shared Responsibility Pay-
ment for Not Maintaining Minimum Essential Coverage, REG-148500-12, at 70 (proposed
2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1), available at http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/
REG-148500-12%20FR.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).  At the time of the decision, a lead-
ing expert estimated that the amount would be $15,000.  Interview with Timothy Jost, Law
Professor, Wash. and Lee Univ. (June 29, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/
06/29/156005219/how-health-laws-taxes-penalties-will-be-enforced.
423 To take just one example, in 1920 the tax on colored oleomargarine raised
$1,194,720.17. 1920 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 278, at 23; cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note
25, at 1211 (stating that in McCray, “[t]he Court was unconcerned that the exaction would
raise negligible revenue”).
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those of the tax assessment itself, which does not seem likely, it would not
appear probable that a law-abiding rational actor would choose to pay the
maximum assessment rather than securing minimum essential coverage.  Of
course, not everyone subject to the tax would pay the maximum assessment.
Others will pay some lesser amount, equivalent to approximately 2.5% of
their income.424  But even among this group there will be some significant
number of people for whom refusing to purchase insurance and paying the
tax will not be the rational course of action.
We can see this if we evaluate the CBO’s projection that 3.9 million peo-
ple would elect to pay the tax rather than purchase qualifying insurance in
light of the number of people that the individual mandate may be expected
to induce to acquire such insurance.  In March of 2012, an Urban Institute
study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation estimated that, under
the ACA, “[a]bout 26.3 million Americans who are currently uninsured will
be required to newly obtain coverage or pay a fine.  In this group, 8.1 million
people will be eligible to receive free or close-to-free insurance through
Medicaid or CHIP and can avoid the mandate penalties if they do so.”425
(The extent to which this will still be the case in view of the Court’s ruling on
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions remains to be seen.)  Thus, the
authors concluded that “18.2 million Americans . . . will be required to newly
purchase coverage or face a penalty.”426  “Of that 18.2 million, 10.9 million
people will be eligible to receive subsidies toward private insurance premi-
ums in the newly established health insurance exchanges, but will have to
make partial contributions toward their coverage.”427  And “[a]bout 7.3 mil-
lion people . . . are not offered any financial assistance under the ACA and
will be subject to penalties if they do not obtain coverage.”428
The CBO’s estimate of the number of people who will pay the tax rather
than buy insurance has been modified since the Court’s decision was handed
down, and depending on future fluctuations in economic conditions, it may
change again.429  But let us take the data as they existed at the time the Court
424 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 419, at 1.
425 Linda J. Blumberg et al., The Individual Mandate in Perspective: Timely Analysis of Imme-
diate Health Policy Issues, URBAN INST, Mar. 2012 at 1, available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/412533-the-individual-mandate.pdf.
426 Id. at 1–2.
427 Id. at 2.
428 Id.
429 In September of 2012, the CBO published a revised estimate projecting that 5.9
million persons would pay the penalty. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR
BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2 (Sept. 19, 2012), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.
pdf.  Most of the increase was attributable to “changes in CBO and JCT’s baseline projec-
tions since April 2010, including the effects of legislation enacted since that time, changes
in the economic outlook (primarily a higher unemployment rate and lower wages and
salaries), and other technical updates.” Id. at 1.  About 15% of the increase was attributed
to the Court’s ruling on the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA.  The CBO and JCT
anticipated that as a result of that ruling some states would not expand Medicaid coverage
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was deciding the question of whether the shared responsibility payment was a
tax or a penalty.  Those, after all, were the data that were either known by or
could be made known to the Justices.  Therefore, let us assume that the
CBO’s projection of 3.9 million people making the shared responsibility pay-
ment was accurate at the time.  If we also assume that the Urban Institute
study’s projections were accurate, then up to 14.3 million people—76% of
the 18.2 million potentially subject to the assessment—could be expected to
be induced either by the tax alone or by the tax in combination with subsi-
dies of various amounts to acquire insurance that they would not otherwise
have purchased.  Moreover, the CBO estimated that 1.4 million people
whose incomes place them above the eligibility threshold for subsidies will
pay the tax.430  This suggested that up to 5.9 million people—81% of the 7.3
million people in this category—might acquire minimum essential coverage
rather than pay the tax.  Of course, both of these percentages could be some-
what lower, as some unknown number of people may seek to avoid both
obtaining insurance and paying the tax.  But these numbers suggested the
possibility that a substantial percentage of potential payers of the tax would
be induced by the assessment to acquire minimum essential coverage.  What
Chief Justice Roberts might have made of these figures had they been
presented by the litigants we do not know.  But if these figures were even
remotely accurate, it seems far from obvious that the ACA does not promise
to impose—to use Powell’s formulation—“a tax sufficiently onerous to
induce them generally to alter the conduct of their business.”431
B. Departure from a Detailed and Specified Course of Conduct
Chief Justice Roberts characterized the shared responsibility payment as
one that “makes going without insurance just another thing the Government
taxes, like buying gasoline or earning income.”432  This formulation makes
the tax sound rather simple, like a tax on coloring oleomargarine, or taking
bets, or selling opium.  The Court has consistently upheld such simple taxes,
even where the exaction was onerous.  It is only where the exaction was cou-
pled with a detailed and specified course of conduct, as in the Child Labor
Tax Case, that the Court has held the exaction to be a penalty rather than a
true tax.  The question, therefore, is whether the exaction imposed by the
ACA is contingent on departure from a detailed and specified course of
conduct.
It is certainly possible to see it that way.  After 2013, the ACA will require
that all “applicable individuals” who do not maintain “minimum essential
coverage” for themselves and their dependents pay the assessment imposed
“to the full extent authorized by the ACA,” and that this would increase the “number of
uninsured” persons “subject to the penalty.” Id. at 1–2.
430 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 419, at 2.  The CBO’s more recent estimate raises
this number to 1.8 million. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 429, at 2.
431 Powell, supra note 373, at 291–92.
432 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
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by the Act.433  An individual can satisfy the requirement to maintain mini-
mum essential coverage in one of five ways: through (1) any government-
sponsored health plan such as Medicare Part A, Medicaid, TRICARE, or
CHIP; (2) any “eligible employer-sponsored plan;” (3) any health plan “in
the individual market;” (4) any grandfathered health plan; or (5) “[s]uch
other health benefits coverage” as may be recognized by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary.434
Thus, if one does not have an employer-sponsored or grandfathered
plan, or does not qualify for a government-funded plan, one must secure
minimum essential coverage through a purchase in the individual market.
Individuals satisfying the mandate through acquisition in the individual mar-
ket may do so either through the Exchanges contemplated by the Act or by
purchasing directly from issuers.435
The individual market is in turn extensively regulated in a detailed and
specified manner by the Act.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) provides that “[a]
health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the individ-
ual or small group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the essen-
tial health benefits package required under § 18022(a) of this title.”436  42
U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B) imposes the same requirement on all qualified
health plans sold on the Exchanges.437  Section 18022(a) defines the term
“essential health benefits package” to mean, “with respect to any health plan,
coverage that—(1) provides for the essential health benefits defined by the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] under subsection (b).”438  Subsec-
tion (b) of § 18022 provides that
the Secretary shall define the essential health benefits, except that such ben-
efits shall include at least the following [ten] general categories and the
items and services covered within the categories: (A) Ambulatory patient ser-
vices[;] (B) Emergency services[;] (C) Hospitalization[;] (D) Maternity and
newborn care[;] (E) Mental health and substance use disorder services,
including behavioral health treatment[;] (F) Prescription drugs[;] (G)
Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices[;] (H) Laboratory ser-
vices[;] (I) Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease manage-
ment[;] (J) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.439
The section also provides further guidance for the Secretary in deter-
mining the content of and balance among each of these ten categories of
services.440  Thus, as Judge Martin explained for the Sixth Circuit in Thomas
More,
433 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(a)–(b)(1) (Supp. V 2011).
434 Id. §§ 5000A(f)(1)(A)–(E).
435 Id. § 5000A(e)(1)(B).
436 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (Supp. V 2011).
437 Id. § 18021(a)(1)(B).
438 Id. § 18022 (a)(1).
439 Id. § 18022(b)(1).
440 Id. §§ 18022(b)(2), (b)(4).
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the Act’s ‘Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage’ . . .
requires every ‘applicable individual’ to obtain ‘minimum essential cover-
age’ for each month.  The Act directs the Secretary of Health and Human
Services in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury to define the
required essential health benefits, which must include at least ten general
categories of services.441
“Applicable individuals who fail to obtain minimum essential coverage must
include with their annual federal tax payment a ‘shared responsibility pay-
ment,’ which is a ‘penalty’ calculated based on household income.”442  The
Act thus may appear only to tax the failure to “buy health insurance,” but it
structures the health insurance market in such a detailed and specified way
that the failure to acquire minimum essential coverage can be viewed as a
departure from a detailed and specified course of conduct.
To see the point, imagine that the Act had permitted insurers to offer
plans covering only one or more of the ten general categories of services
listed above.  Suppose further that the Act had imposed no tax on an applica-
ble individual acquiring a policy with all ten forms of coverage, but had
imposed a graduated tax on individuals acquiring policies with fewer than all
ten.  Thus, suppose that a person with dependents would pay a maximum tax
of $2,000 for acquiring a family policy with nine of the ten services, $4,000 for
acquiring a policy with eight of the ten, and so on, up to a maximum of
$20,000 for failure to acquire a policy with any of the ten forms of coverage.
It would appear that in each instance the tax would be imposed for depar-
ture from a detailed and specified course of conduct, whether the individual
acquired a policy with nine of the forms of coverage or acquired no health
care policy at all.  If the failure to acquire a health care policy under these
circumstances can be seen as a departure from a detailed and specified
course of conduct, then it can be seen as such a departure when the govern-
ment has constructed the market so that the only options are to purchase all
ten forms of coverage or none at all.
To see the point in a different way, imagine that an insurer, in violation
of the law, were to offer for sale a health insurance policy containing fewer
than the requisite ten essential health benefits, and a consumer were to
purchase the policy.  The consumer would have bought “health insurance,”
but it is not clear that she thereby would have acquired “minimum essential
coverage” on the “individual market,” and thus she may be liable for the
shared responsibility payment.  In order to avoid the liability, the consumer
purchasing on the “individual market” may have to acquire a policy contain-
ing each of the ten forms of coverage comprising “essential health benefits.”
Failure to do so may constitute failure to acquire “minimum essential cover-
age.”  Departure from this detailed and specified course of conduct thus
would trigger the imposition of liability.
441 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 534–35 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)).
442 Id. at 535 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b), (c) (Supp. V 2011)).
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If the understandings of Powell and his contemporaries in Congress and
in the child labor reform community were correct, then, there is an argu-
ment to be made that the shared responsibility payment of the ACA would
not have been a tax within the meaning of the Child Labor Tax Case.  If that
conclusion is correct, then the ACA’s mandate would not have been a tax
even if the statute had denominated it as a tax rather than a penalty, even if
Congress had expressly invoked its taxing power and professed an objective
to raise revenue, and even if the statute had conferred upon the IRS the
power to enforce the tax through liens, levies, and criminal prosecution.
The payment would be treated as a penalty rather than a tax because it
imposed a sufficiently onerous exaction on a departure from a highly
detailed and specified course of conduct.  Of course, one cannot be certain
how the Chief Justice might have ruled in a case involving an as-applied chal-
lenge brought by a taxpayer charged with the maximum shared responsibility
payment.  It is conceivable that he may have viewed such an exaction as suffi-
ciently onerous to constitute a penalty rather than a tax.  But if the under-
standing that I have outlined is correct, then the Roberts Court may well have
tacitly overruled the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny.
VII. A LOST GENERATION OF FEDERAL CHILD LABOR REFORM?
There is, however, another alternative to consider, although it is one
that I regard as considerably less likely.  It may be that Powell and his many
contemporaries misread the Child Labor Tax decision, and that a revised
measure eliminating one or more of the distinguishing features identified by
Chief Justice Roberts would have been upheld by the Taft Court of the 1920s.
If that is so, then that generation of child labor reformers made a very costly
strategic error—for the overwhelming support that the Child Labor Amend-
ment enjoyed in both houses of Congress443 and from a variety of political
and social leaders and organizations had left its supporters overly confident
about the prospects for ratification.444  The amendment quickly encoun-
tered determined opposition from a variety of powerful and well-organized
groups,445 and by the end of 1925, only four states had ratified the Child
443 The amendment was approved in the House by a vote of 297–69, 65 CONG. REC.
7295 (1924), and in the Senate by a vote of 61–23, id. at 10,142.
444 KYVIG, supra note 317, at 257–58.  For a list of supporters, see 66 CONG. REC.
5144–45 (1925).  For a collection of statements in support, see id. at 5146–57.
445 These included the National Association of Manufacturers, which organized a
National Committee for Rejection of the 20th Amendment; Southern textile manufactur-
ers, led by David Clark, the editor of the Southern Textile Bulletin; newspaper publishers,
who employed young boys in their sales and delivery operations; the American Farm
Bureau Federation, the Grange, and other farm organizations and agricultural journals;
the Woman Patriots; the American Constitutional League; the Sentinels of the Republic,
whose membership included Everett P. Wheeler, former Assistant Treasury Secretary Louis
A. Coolidge, and Columbia University President Nicholas Murray Butler; former Attorney
General George W. Wickersham; President Sidney E. Mezes of New York’s City College;
President Emeritus Arthur T. Hadley of Yale; U.S. Circuit Judge Henry Galbraith Ward;
Episcopal Bishop William Lawrence of Massachusetts; Episcopal Bishop Arthur S. Lloyd of
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Labor Amendment, while it had been rejected by one or both houses of the
legislatures of nineteen states.446  By 1932, the number of ratifications would
New York; civil rights leader Moorfield Storey; Harvard President A. Lawrence Lowell; Bos-
ton Mayor James Michael Curley; and Cardinal William O’Connell of Boston. See CHAM-
BERS, supra note 275, at 40–46; KYVIG, supra note 317, at 258–60; Child Labor Amendment, 57
CHI. LEGAL NEWS 205, 205–06 (1925); Richard B. Sherman, The Rejection of the Child Labor
Amendment, 45 MID-AM. 3, 10–13 (1963); see also ALBION GUILFORD TAYLOR, LABOR POLICIES
OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS 130–35 (1928); PROC. OF THE TWENTY-
NINTH ANN. CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L ASSOC. OF MFRS. 215 (1924); PROC. OF THE THIRTI-
ETH ANN. CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L ASSOC. OF MFRS. 47–49 (1925); PROC. OF THE THIRTY-
FIRST ANN. CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L ASSOC. OF MFRS. 319 (1926); Catholics and Child
Labor, 120 THE NATION 59, 59 (1925) (criticizing Cardinal O’Connell for speaking out
about the Child Labor Amendment); Frank W. Grinnell, The So-Called “Child Labor” Amend-
ment, 11 VA. L. REV. 121, 121–22 (1924); Hubert C. Herring, The Shame of Massachusetts, 41
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1594, 1594–95 (1924); W.A. Robinson, Advisory Referendum in Massa-
chusetts on the Child Labor Amendment, 19 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 70–71 (1925); The Child
Labor Amendment, 9 CONST. REV. 44, 45–48 (1925); Ban on Child Labor Opposed by Grange,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1924, at 20 (noting that the Grange “voted unanimously in opposition
to the proposed constitutional amendment prohibiting child labor” due to concerns about
centralization and “bureaucratic control”).  A more comprehensive list of opponents, con-
sisting of both individuals and organizations, may be found at 66 CONG. REC. 2571–73
(1925), and at NAT’L CHILD LABOR COMM., HANDBOOK ON THE FEDERAL CHILD LABOR
AMENDMENT 36–43 (1937).  Additional expressions of opposition may be found at 66
CONG. REC. 1861–63, 2568–70, 3210–14, 3350–54 (1925), and 67 CONG. REC. 245–47
(1925).
446 ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 103
(1987).  Critics charged that the authority conferred by the amendment was too broad and
would enable Congress to regulate chores performed in the home and on the farm; that it
set the age limit too high at eighteen; and that it represented and foretold unacceptable
centralization of authority and bureaucratization of everyday life. See A. Piatt Andrew, The
Growing Menace of Overcentralization, 9 Mass. L.Q., Aug. 1924, at 63, 65–68 (emphasizing
states’ rights and concerns about centralization); Geo. Stewart Brown, Correspondence, 97
CENT. L.J. 322, 322 (1924) (arguing that the authority conferred by the amendment was
too broad); Nicholas Murray Butler, The New American Revolution, 10 A.B.A. J. 845, 849
(1924) (arguing that the authority conferred by the amendment was too broad, and urging
that child labor be dealt with by state-level action); Thomas F. Cadwalader, The Proposed
Twentieth Amendment, 8 CONST. REV. 212, 213–14 (1924) (arguing that the authority con-
ferred by the amendment was too broad and expressing concerns about centralization);
A.C. Campbell, The Child Labor Amendment, 60 AM. L. REV. 254, 259–260 (1926); The Child
Labor Amendment, supra note 445, at 47–49 (emphasizing states’ rights and concerns about
centralization); Defeat of the Child Labor Amendment, 9 CONST. REV. 126, 127 (1925) (arguing
that the authority conferred by the amendment was too broad); Grinnell, supra note 445,
at 121–22 (arguing that the authority conferred by the amendment was too broad); Joseph
Lee, Child Labor and Local Responsibility, 10 MASS. L.Q., Nov. 1924, at 80, 80–81 (emphasiz-
ing states’ rights and concerns about centralization); Iredell Meares, Should the Nation Con-
trol Child Labor?, 57 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 156, 156, 158–159 (1924) (arguing that the authority
conferred by the amendment was too broad, and that state-level action was adequate);
Second Thought on the Child Labor Amendment, 9 MASS. L.Q., July 1924, at 15, 15–21 (arguing
that the authority conferred by the amendment was too broad and expressing concerns
about centralization); W.A. Shumaker, The 20th Amendment, 28 L. NOTES 185, 185–87
(1925) (urging against state adoption of the Uniform Child Labor Act); Edmund F. Tra-
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grow only to six of the necessary thirty-six, while the list of rejections would
grow to thirty-eight.447  The year 1933 witnessed renewed interest in the pro-
posed amendment, and by early 1937 a number of states had changed their
minds and a total of twenty-eight had ratified.448  But defeats in New York
and Rhode Island later that year,449 along with passage of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), took the steam out of the movement.
That Act, which prohibited interstate shipment of goods produced by
firms employing children, was regarded by many child labor reformers as
offering at best half a loaf.  Because the statute reached only firms producing
for an interstate market, it covered only about six percent of the 850,000
children then gainfully employed in the United States, and only about a
quarter of those working in non-agricultural occupations.450  The Act did not
cover children working in commercial agriculture, in stores or offices, in
hotels or restaurants or service stations; delivering messages or packages; or
selling newspapers or other items on the street.451  Indeed, under the under-
standing of the Commerce Clause that prevailed at the time, workers
engaged in such “local” occupations could not have been reached by a stat-
ute exercising the commerce power of Congress.452  But because no such
bue, The Proposed Twentieth Amendment to the Federal Constitution—A Vicious Step Toward Cen-
tralization of Power, 61 AM. L. REV. 205, 205–06 (1927) (emphasizing states’ rights and
concerns about centralization); Bentley W. Warren, The Proposed Child Labor Amendment; Its
Implications and Consequences., 11 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–13, 17–18 (1924) (arguing that the
authority conferred by the amendment was too broad, and expressing concerns about cen-
tralization); Everett P. Wheeler, General Welfare and the Rights of Individuals, 97 CENT. L.J.
318, 319–20 (1924) (arguing that the authority conferred by the amendment was too vast);
Ira Jewell Williams, The Child Labor Amendment, 28 L. NOTES 179 (1924) (emphasizing
states’ rights and concerns about centralization); Ira Jewell Williams, The Child Labor
Amendment, 11 A.B.A. J. 132, 132 (1925) (same); see also JAMES A. EMERY, AN EXAMINATION
OF THE PROPOSED TWENTIETH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
11–20 (1924) (arguing that the amendment was unnecessary and that the authority con-
ferred by the amendment was too broad); The Child Labor Amendment, supra note 445, at
205–06 (collecting public statements favoring and opposing ratification); More About the So-
Called Child Labor Amendment, 9 MASS. L.Q., Aug 1924, at 52, 52–62 (printing four pieces,
two in favor of the amendment and two opposed).  Prelates of the Roman Catholic Church
also voiced concerns that the measure would authorize congressional intervention in fam-
ily life and parochial education, and alerted parishioners to the Church’s opposition to the
amendment. CHAMBERS, supra 275, at 40–42; KYVIG, supra note 317, at 260; TRATTNER,
supra note 275, at 171–72, 175–76; Catholics and Child Labor, supra note 445, at 59; Grinnell,
supra note 445, at 121–22; Herring, supra note 445, at 1594–95; Robinson, supra note 445,
at 71; Sherman, supra note 445, at 13; The Child Labor Amendment, supra note 436.
447 KYVIG, supra note 317, at 307.
448 See GRIMES, supra note 446, at 103–04; KYVIG, supra note 317, at 308–09; TRATTNER,
supra note 275, at 189–90, 200–02.
449 TRATTNER, supra note 275, at 202.
450 Id. at 207.
451 Id. at 205, 207.
452 The FLSA, which was drafted with these limits in mind, was later construed by the
Roosevelt Court not to apply to local Western Union messengers, see W. Union Tel. Co. v.
Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1945); not to apply to a cook who prepared and served
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connection of the child’s work to interstate commerce would have been nec-
essary had the statute been formulated as an exercise of the taxing power, a
measure grounded in that authority might have reached and thereby
reduced or eliminated child labor that was beyond the scope of the FLSA.
Yet child labor reformers did not revisit that possibility, and instead persisted
in their pursuit of the eight remaining necessary ratifications.  In this pursuit
they were to be disappointed: no additional states ever purported to ratify the
amendment.453  Subsequent decisions expanding the scope of the commerce
power would make it possible to regulate the employment of children in an
increasing number of these occupations.  But Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis
suggests the possibility that, for at least two decades, leaders of the movement
for federal child labor reform overlooked a constitutionally viable taxing
power alternative that could have significantly reduced the employment of
children in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Sebelius clearly resuscitated the Progressive-Era asymmetry between the
respective scopes of the commerce and taxing powers.  Yet the decision
leaves murky the future contours of a taxing power jurisprudence that is
likely to become increasingly important.  Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
offers assurances that “Congress’s ability to use its taxing power to influence
conduct is not without limits,”454 but beyond the restrictions imposed by the
Bill of Rights, it is not clear exactly what those limits might be.  After noting
that in its more recent cases the Court has “declined to closely examine the
regulatory motive or effect of revenue-raising measures,” the Chief Justice
reasserts Taft’s Child Labor Tax Case principle that “ ‘there comes a time in the
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its char-
acter as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regula-
tion and punishment.’”455  Because the Chief Justice concluded that the
ACA’s shared responsibility payment “pass[ed] muster as a tax under our
narrowest interpretations of the taxing power,” he deemed it unnecessary to
“decide the precise point at which an exaction becomes so punitive that the
taxing power does not authorize it.”456  He insisted, however, that “the
‘power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.’”457
meals to maintenance-of-way employees of an interstate railroad pursuant to a contract
between his employer and the railroad company, see McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491,
497–98 (1943); and not to apply to maintenance employees of a metropolitan office build-
ing, operated as an independent enterprise, which was to be used by a wide variety of
tenants, including some producers of goods for interstate commerce, 10 E. 40th St. Bldg.,
Inc., v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 584 (1945).
453 TRATTNER, supra note 275, at 208.
454 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012).
455 Id. (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)).
456 Id. at 2600.
457 Id. (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Tex. Co., 336 U.S. 342, 364 (1949)).
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This Article has endeavored to articulate reasons to question the conten-
tion that the shared responsibility payment actually does pass muster under
the Court’s “narrowest interpretations of the taxing power,” even when given
the benefit of a “saving construction.”  Whether the Chief Justice would have
seen the matter differently had such reasons been presented to the Court is a
matter about which we can only speculate.  But it does appear likely that one
of two things is true: either the Court has effectively abandoned the principle
established in the Child Labor Tax Case and its progeny, or child protection
advocates of the interwar period were badly mistaken in their assessment of
that decision, at the cost of a lost generation of federal child labor reform.
